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ABSTRACT
Analysis of Implementation and Application of Procedural Due 
Process Required by Goss v. Lopez
by
Timothy D. Stephens
Dr. Gerald C. Kops, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Educational Eeadership 
University o f Nevada, Eas Vegas
This dissertation examines the jurisprudence of student procedural due process 
rights. Review of the literature available prior to the recognition of student due process 
rights hy the Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez (1975) was performed and subsequently 
led to questions directly related to the emergence o f due process protections. A detailed 
analysis of Goss v. Lopez (1975) identified student due process standards. Following the 
decision, courts cited the precedent on nearly two thousand five hundred occasions. 
Review of these citations yielded eighty-six cases relevant to analysis o f implementation 
and application of the Goss precedent. Finally, the patterns of interruption and 
application and unanswered questions were identified.
Since 1975 Federal Courts have been called upon to interpret and apply the Goss 
precedent. This study investigates the implementation and application of Goss by 
Federal Courts. This study targeted student due process. In reviewing case law dealing 
with the administration o f the Fourteenth Amendment, the study determined how the 
various federal courts have interpreted and applied the Goss landmark over the past three
111
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decades. This study also reviewed Nevada Revises Statues and Clark County School 
District Policy and Regulations to determine their consistency with Goss v. Lopez. 
Special attention to cases in which school administrators were questioned with regard to 
the application of due process during student discipline procedures was presented. 
Finally, the study sought to identify patterns in the courts’ rulings that provide guidance 
for today’s school administrators faced with student discipline issues.
IV
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Between February and March 1971, there was widespread student unrest in the 
Columbus Public School System in Ohio. It was a turbulent time throughout the country 
and the students in Columbus were riding the wave of civil disobedience. The Vietnam 
War had sparked riots throughout the country with many protesters o f the War 
committing the same offenses they vocalized against. Tinker v. Des Moines School 
District upheld the right of high school students to wear black armbands in protest to the 
Vietnam War and, more importantly the right to engage in protest as long as it did not 
materially or substantially disrupt learning in the school environment. Administrators 
throughout the Country recognized student discipline as a problem. The discipline of 
students as a result of a high school disruption ultimately led to a determination of 
constitutional implications of student discipline.
Six of the students were suspended from Marion-Franklin High School in 
Columbus for ten-days for disruptive or disobedient conduct, which was committed in the 
presence of the school administrator. Tyrone Washington was demonstrating in the 
school auditorium when he was directed hy the school principal to leave. Washington 
refused to comply and was being physically escorted out o f the auditorium hy a police 
officer when another student, Rudolph Sutton, attacked the officer. The principal
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immediately suspended Sutton, Washington, and four others. None of the students were 
given the opportunity to tell their side o f the story at the time of their suspensions.
Also during that time, student unrest was also escalating at Central High School in 
Columhus as well. Dwight Lopez was suspended for damaging school property in the 
lunchroom during a disturbance. Lopez was among seventy-five students suspended 
from Central High School that day; however, he later insisted he was simply an innocent 
bystander rather than an active participant. Like the students at Marion-Franklin High 
School, Lopez also did not receive an opportunity to state his side o f the story at the time 
o f his suspension. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 734)
According to Ohio Rev. Code Section 3313.66 (1972), school administrators were 
empowered to suspend an unruly student for ten days or expel a student for misconduct. 
The administrator was required to notify the student’s parents within 24 hours and state 
the reasons for his/her actions. There were, however, no provisions in the Rev. Code that 
afforded any due process procedures for a student who was suspended. Ohio Law also 
stated that children in the state were entitled to a free education between the ages of six 
and twenty-one. (Rev. Code Ann 3313.64, 1972)
Students challenged their discipline in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division (372 F. Supp. 1279). A three-judge District 
Court panel overturned the disciplinary action finding the state law constitutionally 
flawed because it failed to afford students due process. The panel then established a 
three-pronged standard of due process. The first standard permitted the immediate 
removal of a student whose conduct “disrupts the academic atmosphere of the school, 
endangers fellow students, teachers, or school officials, or damages property.” Second,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the District Court declared that there were “minimum requirements of notice and a 
hearing prior to suspension, except in emergency situation.” The District Court stated 
that relevant case authority would “require notice of suspension proceedings to he sent to 
the student’s parents within 24 hours of the decision. Third, the District Court required a 
hearing of sorts, in which the student would he informed o f the charge and allowed to 
respond to allegations / charges. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 735)”
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part that “nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... (U.S. 
Constitution, 14*'’ Amendment)” The school discipline obviously did not infringe a life 
interest, however, the District Court reasoned that removal from school implicated a 
property interest established by the Ohio Law providing that Ohio children were entitled 
to an education. The panel also determined that removal from school implicated a liberty 
interest because of the record made of such action. Specifically, the District Court held;
1. Students facing temporary suspension from a public school have 
property and liberty interests that qualify for protection under the Due 
Process Clause o f the Fourteenth Amendment. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P.
735)
(a) Having chosen to extend the right to an education to people of 
appellees' class generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on 
grounds of misconduct, absent fundamentally fair procedures to 
determine whether the misconduct has occurred, and must 
recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as 
a property interest that is protected hy the Due Process Clause, and 
that may not he taken away for misconduct without observing 
minimum procedures required hy that Clause. (Goss v. Lopez,
1975 P. 731)
(b) Since misconduct charges if sustained and recorded could 
seriously damage the students' reputation as well as interfere with 
later educational and employment opportunities, the State's 
claimed right to determine unilaterally and without process 
whether that misconduct has occurred immediately collides with
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the Due Process Clause's prohibition against arbitrary deprivation 
of liberty. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 732)
(c) A 10-day suspension from school is not de minimis and may 
not be imposed in complete disregard of the Due Process Clause.
Neither the property interest in educational benefits temporarily 
denied nor the liberty interest in reputation is so insubstantial that 
suspensions may constitutionally he imposed by any procedure the 
school chooses, no matter how arbitrary. tGoss v. Lopez. 1975 P.
732)
2. Due process requires, in connection with a suspension o f 10 days or 
less, that the student he given oral or written notice o f the charges against 
him and, if  he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities 
have and an opportunity to present his version. Generally, notice and 
hearing should precede the student's removal from school, since the 
hearing may almost immediately follow the misconduct, but if prior notice 
and hearing are not feasible, as where the student's presence endangers 
persons or property or threatens disruption of the academic process, thus 
justifying immediate removal from school, the necessary notice and 
hearing should follow as soon as practicable. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 732)
Additionally, the District Court ruled;
“that there were "minimum requirements of notice and a hearing prior to 
suspension, except in emergency situations." In explication, the court stated that 
relevant case authority would: (1) permit "[immediate] removal of a student 
whose conduct disrupts the academic atmosphere o f the school, endangers fellow 
students, teachers or school officials, or damages property"; (2) require notice of 
suspension proceedings to he sent to the student's parents within 24 hours of the 
decision to conduct them; and (3) require a hearing to be held, with the student 
present, within 72 hours of his removal. Finally, the court stated that, with respect 
to the nature o f the hearing, the relevant cases required that statements in support 
of the charge be produced, that the student and others he permitted to make 
statements in defense or mitigation, and that the school need not permit 
attendance hy counsel. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 735)”
Various administrators of the Columhus, Ohio, Public School System challenged 
the judgment of the three-judge federal court by filing an appeal with the Supreme Court 
of the United States. The Goss v. Lopez Court rejected the view that attendance at public 
school was a privilege, allowing administrators to withdraw students at will, and further 
rejected the notion that school authorities stand in loco parentis to the student and 
thereby, have full parental discretion in matters of discipline. (Wilkinson III, 1975)
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Justice White, writing for the majority noted that Ohio law provided for a free 
education and also allowed for a principal of an Ohio public school to suspend a pupil for 
misconduct for up to 10 days without a hearing or to expel him. He also noted that the 
statute required the principal to notify the parent within 24-hours o f their child’s removal 
from school. A pupil or parent o f  a pupil that is recommended for expulsion has the right 
to appeal to the Board of Education. The Board also had the right to reinstate such 
student.
Justice White found that Columbus, Ohio Publie School System was devoid of
any written procedure applicable to suspensions. Additionally, Justice White declared,
“[Mjany school authorities may well prefer the untrammeled power to act 
unilaterally, unhampered by rules about notice and hearing. But it would be a 
strange disciplinary system in an educational institution if no communication was 
sought hy the disciplinarian with the student in an effort to inform him of his 
dereliction and to let him tell his side of the story in order to make sure that an 
injustice is not done. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P.739)”
Even when the disciplinarian is the person who witnessed the misbehavior of the student,
which had necessitated the suspension. Justice White insisted that the student was still
entitled to notice and a hearing. “The student will at least have the opportunity to
characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper context. (Goss v. Lopez.
1975 P. 739)” The narrow, 5-4, decision fundamentally changed the procedure used hy
school administrators disciplining students. Specifically, the Supreme Court held;
“This appeal by various administrators of the Columhus, Ohio, Public School 
System (CPSS) challenges the judgment of a three-judge federal court, declaring 
that appellees — various high school students in the CPSS — were denied due 
process of law contrary to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment in that 
they were temporarily suspended from their high schools without a hearing either 
prior to suspension or within a reasonable time thereafter, and enjoining the 
administrators to remove all references to such suspensions from the students' 
records. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 732)”
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“At the outset, appellants contend that because there is no constitutional right to 
an education at public expense, the Due Process Clause does not protect against 
expulsions from the public school system. This position misconceives the nature 
of the issue and is refuted by prior decisions. The Fourteenth Amendment forbids 
the State to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law. Protected interests in property are normally "not created hy the Constitution. 
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined" by an independent 
source such as state statutes or rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits. (Goss 
V. Lopez, 1975, P. 735)”
“Here, on the basis of state law, appellees plainly had legitimate claims of 
entitlement to a public education. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3313.48 and 3313.64 
(1972 and Supp. 1973) direct local authorities to provide a free education to all 
residents between five and 21 years of age, and a compulsory-attendance law 
requires attendance for a school year of not less than 32 weeks. (Goss v. Lopez, 
1975, Pp. 735 - 736)”
“Although Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated to establish and maintain a 
public school system, it has nevertheless done so and has required its children to 
attend. Those young people do not "shed their constitutional rights" at the 
schoolhouse door. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen 
against the State itself and all of its creatures — Boards o f Education not 
excepted." West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 
(1943). The authority possessed hy the State to prescribe and enforce standards of 
conduct in its schools although concededly very broad, must he exercised 
consistently with constitutional safeguards. Among other things, the State is 
constrained to recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as 
a property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause and which may 
not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures 
required by that Clause. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975, P. 736)”
“The Due Process Clause also forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty. "Where a 
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the 
government is doing to him," the minimal requirements o f the Clause must he 
satisfied. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); Board of 
Regents v. Roth, supra, at 573. School authorities here suspended appellees from 
school for periods of up to 10 days based on charges o f misconduct. If sustained 
and recorded, those charges could seriously damage the students' standing with 
their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities 
for higher education and employment. It is apparent that the claimed right of the 
State to determine unilaterally and without process whether that misconduet has 
occurred immediately collides with the requirements of the Constitution. (Goss v. 
Lonez. 1975, P. 736)”
“Appellants proceed to argue that even if there is a right to a public education 
protected by the Due Process Clause generally, the Clause comes into play only
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when the State subjects a student to a "severe detriment or grievous loss." The 
loss o f 10 days, it is said, is neither severe nor grievous and the Due Process 
Clause is therefore of no relevance. Appellants' argument is again refuted by our 
prior decisions; for in determining "whether due process requirements apply in the 
first place, we must look not to the 'weight' hut to the nature o f the interest at 
stake." Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at 570-571. Appellees were excluded 
from school only temporarily, it is true, but the length and consequent severity of 
a deprivation, while another faetor to weigh in determining the appropriate form 
of hearing, "is not decisive of the basic right" to a hearing of some kind. Puentes 
V. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972). The Court's view has been that as long as a 
property deprivation is not de minimis, its gravity is irrelevant to the question 
whether account must be taken of the Due Process Clause. Sniadach v. Family 
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Flarlan, J., concurring); Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-379 (1971); Board o f Regents v. Roth, supra, at 
570 n. 8. A 10-day suspension from school is not de minimis in our view and may 
not be imposed in complete disregard o f the Due Process Clause. (Goss v. Lopez. 
1975, Pp. 736 - 737)"
“A short suspension is, of course, a far milder deprivation than expulsion. But, 
"education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments," Brown v. Board o f Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), and the 
total exclusion from the educational process for more than a trivial period, and 
certainly if the suspension is for 10 days, is a serious event in the life of the 
suspended child. Neither the property interest in educational benefits temporarily 
denied nor the liberty interest in reputation, which is also implicated, is so 
insubstantial that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any procedure 
the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975, P. 737)”
"Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process 
is due." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S., at 481. We turn to that question, fully 
realizing as our cases regularly do that the interpretation and application of the 
Due Process Clause are intensely practical matters and that "[the] very nature of 
due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to 
every imaginable situation." Cafeteria Workers v. MeLlroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 
(1961). We are also mindful o f our own admonition:”
"Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system 
of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint. . . .  By 
and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the 
control of state and local authorities. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975, P.
738)"
“There are certain benchmarks to guide us, however. Mullane v. Central Hanover 
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), a ease often invoked hy later opinions, said that 
"[many] controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due 
Process Clause but there can he no doubt that at a minimum they require that 
deprivation of life, liberty or property hy adjudication he preceded by notice and
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opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature o f the ease." Id., at 313. "The 
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to he heard," 
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914), a right that "has little reality or 
worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for 
himself whether to . . . contest." Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., supra, at 
314. See also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Anti-Fascist 
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168-169 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
eoncurring). At the very minimum, therefore, students facing suspension and the 
consequent interference with a protected property interest must he given some 
kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing. "Parties whose rights are to be 
affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they 
must first he notified. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975, P. 738)”
“It also appears from our cases that the timing and content o f the notice and the 
nature of the hearing will depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing 
interests involved. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, supra, at 895; Morrissey v. 
Brewer, supra, at 481. The student's interest is to avoid unfair or mistaken 
exclusion from the educational process, with all o f its unfortunate consequences. 
The Due Process Clause will not shield him from suspensions properly imposed, 
hut it disserves both his interest and the interest of the State if  his suspension is in 
fact unwarranted. The concern would be mostly academic if  the disciplinary 
process were a totally accurate, unerring process, never mistaken and never 
unfair. Unfortunately, that is not the case, and no one suggests that it is. 
Disciplinarians, although proceeding in utmost good faith, frequently act on the 
reports and advice of others; and the controlling facts and the nature of the 
conduct under challenge are often disputed. The risk of error is not at all trivial, 
and it should he guarded against if that may he done without prohibitive cost or 
interference with the educational process. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975, Pp. 738 - 739)”
“The difficulty is that our schools are vast and complex. Some modicum of 
discipline and order is essential if the educational function is to he performed. 
Events calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require 
immediate, effective action. Suspension is considered not only to he a necessary 
tool to maintain order hut a valuable educational device. The prospect of 
imposing elaborate hearing requirements in every suspension case is viewed with 
great concern, and many school authorities may well prefer the untrammeled 
power to act unilaterally, unhampered by rules about notice and hearing. But it 
would be a strange disciplinary system in an educational institution if  no 
communication was sought hy the disciplinarian with the student in an effort to 
inform him of his dereliction and to let him tell his side of the story in order to 
make sure that an injustice is not done. "[Fairness] can rarely he obtained by 
secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights. . . . "  "Secrecy is not 
congenial to truth-seeking and self-righteousness gives too slender an assurance 
of rightness. No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to 
give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice o f the case against him and 
opportunity to meet it. Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, supra, at 170, 171- 
172 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 739)”
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“We do not believe that school authorities must be totally free from notice and 
hearing requirements if  their schools are to operate with acceptable efficiency. 
Students facing temporary suspension have interests qualifying for protection of 
the Due Process Clause, and due process requires, in connection with a 
suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of 
the charges against him and, if  he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the 
authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story. The Clause 
requires at least these rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken findings 
of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 739 -
740)”
“There need he no delay between the time "notice" is given and the time of the 
hearing. In the great majority o f cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss 
the alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred. We hold 
only that, in being given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts at this 
discussion, the student first be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis 
of the accusation is. Lower courts which have addressed the question of the nature 
of the procedures required in short suspension cases have reached the same 
conclusion. Tate v. Board of Education, 453 F.2d 975, 979 (CAS 1972); Vail v. 
Board of Education, 354 F.Supp. 592, 603 (NH 1973). Since the hearing may 
occur almost immediately following the misconduct, it follows that as a general 
rule notice and hearing should precede removal o f the student from school. We 
agree with the District Court, however, that there are recurring situations in which 
prior notice and hearing cannot be insisted upon. Students whose presence poses a 
continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat o f disrupting the 
academic process may he immediately removed from school. In such cases, the 
necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should follow as soon as practicable, as 
the District Court indicated. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 740)”
“In holding as we do, we do not believe that we have imposed procedures on 
school disciplinarians which are inappropriate in a classroom setting. Instead we 
have imposed requirements, which are, if anything, less than a fair-minded school 
principal would impose upon himself in order to avoid unfair suspensions. Indeed, 
according to the testimony of the principal of Marion-Franklin High School, that 
school had an informal procedure, remarkably similar to that which we now 
require, applicable to suspensions generally but which was not followed in this 
case. Similarly, according to the most recent memorandum applicable to the entire 
CPSS, see n. 1, supra, school principals in the CPSS are now required hy local 
rule to provide at least as much as the constitutional minimum which we have 
described. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975, P. 740)”
“We stop short of construing the Due Process Clause to require, countrywide, that 
hearings in connection with short suspensions must afford the student the 
opportunity to secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
supporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify his version o f the 
incident. Brief disciplinary suspensions are almost countless. To impose in each 
such case even truncated trial-type procedures might well overwhelm
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administrative facilities in many places and, by diverting resources, cost more 
than it would save in educational effectiveness. Moreover, further formalizing the 
suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only 
make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool hut also destroy its effectiveness 
as part of the teaching process. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 740 - 741)”
“On the other hand, requiring effective notice and informal hearing permitting the 
student to give his version of the events will provide a meaningful hedge against 
erroneous action. At least the disciplinarian will he alerted to the existence of 
disputes about facts and arguments about cause and effect. He may then 
determine himself to summon the accuser, permit cross-examination, and allow 
the student to present his own witnesses. In more difficult cases, he may permit 
counsel. In any event, his discretion will be more informed and we think the risk 
of error substantially reduced. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 741)”
“Requiring that there be at least an informal give-and-take between student and 
disciplinarian, preferably prior to the suspension, will add little to the fact-finding 
function where the disciplinarian himself has witnessed the conduct forming the 
basis for the charge. But things are not always as they seem to be, and the student 
will at least have the opportunity to characterize his conduct and put it in what he 
deems the proper context. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 741)”
“We should also make it clear that we have addressed ourselves solely to the short 
suspension, not exceeding 10 days. Longer suspensions or expulsions for the 
remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal 
procedures. Nor do we put aside the possibility that in unusual situations, 
although involving only a short suspension, something more than the rudimentary 
procedures will he required. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 741)”
“The District Court found each of the suspensions involved here to have occurred 
without a hearing, either before or after the suspension, and that each suspension 
was therefore invalid and the statute unconstitutional insofar as it permits such 
suspensions without notice or hearing. Accordingly, the judgment is Affirmed. 
(Goss V. Lopez. 1975 P. 741)”
Justice Powell wrote the dissenting opinion. He vocalized his concern that 
schools should he run and governed by the experts, school officials. Justice Powell, with 
whom The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined, in his 
dissenting opinion, warned, “no one can foresee the ultimate frontiers of the new ‘thicket’ 
the Court now enters.” “This potential ‘thicket’ of micromanagement of the nation’s
10
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public schools by the Courts necessitated changes in school district’s policies and
regulations as well as laws governing the disciplining of students in each state throughout
the country. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 741)” Justice Powell warned;
“The Court today invalidates an Ohio statute that permits student suspensions 
from school without a hearing “for not more than ten days.” The decision 
unnecessarily opens avenues for judicial intervention in the operation of our 
public schools that may affect adversely the quality o f education. The Court 
holds for the first time that the federal courts, rather than educational officials and 
state legislatures, have the authority to determine the rules applicable to routine 
classroom discipline of children and teenagers in the public schools. It justifies 
this unprecedented intrusion into the process o f elementary and secondary 
education by identifying a new constitutional right: the right of a student not to he 
suspended for as much as a single day without notice and a due process hearing 
either before or promptly following the suspension. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P.
741)”
Justice Powell continued hy stating,
’’The Court’s decision rests on the premise that, under Ohio law, education is a 
property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
and therefore that any suspension requires notice and a hearing. In my view, a 
student’s interest in education is not infringed hy a suspension within the limited 
period prescribed by Ohio law. Moreover, to the extent that there may he some 
arguable infringement, it is too speculative, transitory, and insubstantial to justify 
imposition o f a constitutional rule. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 742)”
School authorities were troubled hy the Court’s ruling. Specifically, could the
decision regarding the new requirement to provide notice and due process procedures
when suspending students he extended to include academic decisions, such as grade
promotion, or suspension from extra-curricular activities? Or, could its scope be
extended to include even more trivial disciplinary decisions such as giving a child
detention or In-House Suspension?
Thirty years have now passed since the Court’s ruling in Goss yet, no study has
examined the implementation and application of the landmark decision. Since 1975,
Courts have rendered a variety of decisions citing Goss that both affirm the due process
11
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standard set forth in Goss, and determined its scope and impact on other issues unrelated 
to student discipline in the educational setting.
Research Prohlem
This study examined how the Supreme Court and federal courts have interpreted 
and applied the standard set forth in this landmark case. Additionally, the study analyzed 
issues that have emerged since the landmark precedent. The study includes a review of 
the Nevada Revised Statutes in addition to Clark County School District Policies and 
Regulations. The focus of the review was to determine whether the Clark County School 
District Policies and Regulations complied with the notice and due process standard set 
forth in Goss v. Lopez. Finally, the study provides guidance to current and future 
administrators with regard to the Goss v. Lopez decision/precedent.
Research Questions 
In the course of surveying the literature related to Goss v. Lopez, reviewing 
rulings in various federal courts— district, circuit, and Supreme—and analyzing the 
Nevada Revised Statutes and Clark County School District Policies and Regulations, the 
study sought answers to the following research questions;
• How have the Federal Courts interpreted and applied the due process standard set 
forth in Goss v. Lopez?
• What if  any issues as to the meaning o f Goss v. Lopez have emerged since the 
landmark precedent?
• Have the Nevada Statutes heen revised to comply with the standard set forth in 
Goss V. Lopez?
• Have the Clark County School District Regulations and Policies heen aligned 
with the Nevada Statutes and Goss v. Lopez?
12
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Based on jurisprudence of Goss what should administrators do to comply with the 
Goss V. Lopez decision/precedent?
Methodology Summary
“The purpose of researching the law is to ascertain the legal consequenees of a 
specific set o f actual or potential facts” (Wren & Wren, 1986). In this study a specific 
methodology was utilized. Review of pertinent literature was performed. Specifically, 
law reviews, books, periodicals, and journals were examined for their relevance with 
regard to Goss v. Lopez and student procedural due process. Goss v. Lopez was 
“Shepardized.” Shepardization of the landmark case produced 2,492 federal court cases 
that cited Goss. Lach of the nearly 2,500 cases was examined. Specifically, all cases that 
did not directly apply to public schools, students, and procedural due process were 
discarded. Lighty-six cases were relevant to the study. Lach of the remaining eighty-six 
eases were briefed, with respect to the following categories; case, procedural setting, 
facts, holding, rationale of holding, and if applicable the concurring and / or dissenting 
opinions offered by the court.
The cases were studied for implementation and application patterns contained 
therein. Nevada Revised Statutes and Clark County School District Regulations and 
Policies were scrutinized in order to determine if they adhered to the jurisprudence of 
Goss. Finally, interpretation and application of Goss v. Lopez was utilized in order to 
answer the research questions raised hy the review of literature. This analysis of Goss v. 
Lopez jurisprudence provided data regarding appropriate practice when dealing with 
student discipline.
13
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Significance of the Study 
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine jurisprudence of Goss v. Lopez 
precedent regarding legal controversies over due process rights of students in public 
schools. The results o f the study are useful for school administrators throughout the State 
of Nevada and elsewhere who are considering due process concerns when making 
disciplinary and non-disciplinary decisions related to students.
In an age when school officials are frequently sued hy parents for making 
unpopular disciplinary related decisions, this study will serve as a useful tool to ensure 
the Fourteenth Amendment rights o f students are not violated. By referring to the study 
when making difficult disciplinary decisions, a school principal may prevent a lawsuit hy 
complying with precedents that have been established hy the courts. Finally, state 
legislators and school hoard members may also refer to the study as a guide when 
considering changes in law and/or policy in regard to complying with the due process 
standard set forth in Goss v. Lopez.
Definitions of Terms 
For the purpose of this study, definitions provided by the courts are used when 
possible, otherwise the default authority is Blacks Law (2000). The following definitions 
of terms are provided:
Amendment: A formal revision or addition proposed or made to statute, constitution, or 
other instrument (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 33).
Appeal: A proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered hy bringing it to a 
higher authority; esp., the submission of a lower court’s or agency’s decision to a higher 
court for review and possible reversal (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 38).
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Bill of Rights: A section or addendum, usu. In a constitution, defining the situations in 
which a politically organized society will permit free, spontaneous, and individual 
aetivity, and guaranteeing that governmental powers will not be used in certain ways; 
esp., the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 69).
Brief: A written statement setting out the legal contentions of a party in litigation, esp., 
on appeal; a document prepared by counsel as the hasis for arguing a case, consisting of 
legal and factual arguments and the authorities in support o f them (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 
78^
Certiorari-. Gaining appellate review. An extraordinary writ issued hy an appellate court, 
at its discretion, direeting a lower court to deliver the record in the case for review 
(Blacks Law, 2000 P. 91).
Constitutional Rights: A right guaranteed by a constitution; esp., one guaranteed by the 
U.S. Constitution or hy a state constitution (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 134).
Decision: a judicial determination after consideration of the facts and the law; esp., a 
ruling, order, or judgment pronounced hy a court when considering or disposing of a case 
(Blacks Law, 2000 P. 178).
Due process: The conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and 
prineiples for the protection and enforcement of private rights, ineluding notice and the 
right to a fair hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case (Blaeks Law, 
2000 P. 223).
En Banc: With all judges present and participating; in full court (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 
223).
Equal Protection: The constitutional guarantee under the 14*'’ Amendment that the 
government must treat a person or class of persons the same as it treats other persons or 
classes in like circumstances (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 240).
Fighting words: Inflammatory speech that might not he proteeted by the First 
Amendment’s free speech guarantee because it might incite a violent response (Blacks 
Law, 2000 P. 283).
In Loco Parentis: Of, relating to, or acting as a temporary guardian or caretaker o f a 
ehild, taking on all or some of the responsihilities of a parent (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 351).
Procedural Due Process: The minimal requirements of notice and a hearing guaranteed 
by the Due Process Clauses of the 5*'’ and 14*'’ Amendments, esp., if  the deprivation of a 
significant life, liberty, or property interest may occur (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 223).
Speech: The expression or communication of thoughts or opinions in spoken words; 
something spoken or uttered (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 658).
15
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Student: Any person with respect to whom an educational agency or institution 
maintains education records or personally identifiable information, but does not include a 
person who has not been in attendance at such agency or institution (FERPA, 2000).
Substantive Due Process: The doctrine that the Due Process Clauses of the 5"’ and 14*'’ 
amendments require legislation to be fair and reasonable in content and to further a 
legitimate governmental objective (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 223).
Supreme Court: An appellate court existing in most states, usu. as the court o f last resort 
(Blacks Law, 2000 P. 682).
U.S. Supreme Court: The court of last resort in the federal system, whose members are 
appointed by the President and approved by the Senate (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 682).
Limitations and Delimitations 
The following six limitations and delimitations should be considered when the 
results of this study are reviewed. First, the case law examined in the study was limited 
to reported decisions of actions brought in the federal courts. Even though the rights in 
question are also guaranteed in many state constitutions, the ultimate authority in such 
matters rests with the federal court system. Second, with the exception of the text of 
Goss V. Lopez, which is located in Appendix A, the full text of the other reviewed court 
decisions was not included within the study, instead appropriate citations and brief format 
were utilized to examine the relevant case law. Therefore, this study relies in the skills of 
the researcher to determine critical aspects of the relevance of each case. Third, a cutoff 
date of December 31, 2003 was imposed on the inclusion of completed and published 
federal court cases in the study, because of the amount of material to be examined.
Fourth, because of the sheer bulk of cases citing Goss, only those involving public K-12 
school students were examined. Some selected non-school / non-student cases were 
referenced because of their relevance to the inquiries made by the study, and to their 
having been cited in court opinions. Fifth, Goss v. Lopez is referenced by page number
16
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from Appendix A. Finally, the results of the legislative review of the Nevada Revised 
Statutes and the Clark County School District Policies and Regulations may not be 
applicable to other states or school districts.
Summary
Goss V. Lopez established the basic framework for student procedural of due 
process that has been in place for almost thirty years. First, a student may be 
immediately removed if his conduct “disrupts the academic atmosphere of the school, 
endangers fellow students, teachers, or school officials, or damages property.” Second, 
Goss requires issuance of notice o f the infraction which usually takes place in a pre­
suspension conference with the student. Additionally, during that hearing the school 
administrator must provide “statements in support of the charge.” Third, the student must 
be permitted to respond in defense or mitigation (Goss. 1975).
While a landmark decision, such as Goss v. Lopez, provides a standard that must 
be implemented throughout the country, it is not written in stone and is subject to both 
interpretation and application. Since 1975, Courts have rendered a variety o f decisions 
that both affirm the due process standard set forth in Goss, and also define its scope and 
impact on other issues related to student discipline.
This chapter has introduced the inquiry, the research problem, and the research 
questions. It has also delineated the research methodology and provided a definition of 
relevant terms, introduced the significance of the study, and outlined the limitations and 
delimitations. Chapter 2 will review relevant literature.
17
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction
Chapter two provides an overview of the law and literature in place before and 
during the Goss v. Lopez litigation as well as scholarly commentary and a review of the 
federal court system.
“Ever since antiquity, every society has had some concept of due process. Due process is 
tied to custom, which can vary even among regions or localities within a nation. Due 
process generally refers to the regularity, fairness, equality, and degree of justice in both 
procedures and outcomes. Fairness is the idea of doing what’s best. It may not be 
perfect, but it’s the good and decent thing to do. Not only does the outcome have to be 
fair, but so does everything along the line such as evidence gathering and presentation 
(Chemerinsky, 2000).”
Due process, that which comports the notion of what is fair, right, and just, has been 
evolving since the beginning of time (Solesbee v. Balkcom. 1950). The oldest court 
record (2500 B.C.) showed the Egyptian legal procedure included allegations of a claim, 
denials by the other, and the requirement that the first party produce credible witnesses 
who will make oath supporting him (Forkosch, 2003).
Around 2000 B.C., Mesopotamian legal records also showed similar procedures 
by following the statement, “Neither shalt thou bear false witness against thy neighbor” 
(Forkosch, 2003). Additionally, China detailed the provision of “notice” around the same 
time frame. The Roman Twelve Tables also required analogous notice and hearing.
Even into the eleventh century, procedural requirements were adhered to, as in the decree
18
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of Conrad II in 1037 that “no man shall be deprived of life .. .but by the laws of the 
empire and the judgment of his peers...” (Stubbs, 1908). Article 39 of the Magna Carta 
(June 15, 1215) and its subsequent interpretation clearly outlined procedures for due 
process. The Magna Carta became a sacred text in England and famous as the precursor 
of the phrase, “due process of law,” first used by Edward 111 in a statute of 1354 
(Forkosch, 2003).
At the beginning of the modem period in France, the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen {Droits de l ’homme et du citoyen) stated that “no man should be 
accused, arrested, or held in confinement, except in cases determined by the law, and 
according to the forms which it has prescribed” (Forkosch, 2003). The American 
colonials modified the idea of due process of law in the documents preceding and 
following the American Revolution. Due process law claimed as a right by the Congress 
of the Colonies held in New York in 1765. Similarly, the famous Declaration of Rights 
adopted by Virginia in 1776 guaranteed that “no man be deprived o f his liberty, except by 
the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers” (Forkosch, 2003).
In 1789 James Madison proposed the clause that eventually became part of the 
Fifth Amendment, that “No person shall.. .be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process o f law” (Forkosch, 2003). The Fourteenth Amendment was added in 
1868. The Fourteenth Amendment included “No State shall,” to the phrase. Therefore, 
as the Fifth Amendment limits federal government, the Fourteenth Amendment limits the 
power of the state.
19
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Review of the Law and Literature
The Washington Post noted, “It is estimated by the National Education
Association that at least 70,000 teachers are being assaulted every year by students and
that 15,000 have had personal property stolen or vandalized. In the school year 1972-73,
{large) numbers {of students) were assaulted, beaten, stabbed, robbed or shot”
(Washington Post, 1975). A subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired
by Senator Birch Bayh, conducted the most extensive study on the subject o f student
violence for the school years 1970 -  71, 1971 -7 2 ,  and 1972 -  73. It concluded:
“It is alarmingly apparent that student misbehavior and conflict within our school 
system is no longer limited to a fistfight between individual students or an 
occasional general disruption resulting from a specific incident. Instead our 
schools are experiencing serious crimes o f a felonious nature including brutal 
assaults on teachers and students, as well as rapes, extortions, burglaries, thefts 
and an unprecedented wave of wanton destruction and vandalism. Moreover our 
preliminary study of the situation has produced compelling evidence that this 
level of violence and vandalism is reaching crisis proportions which seriously 
threaten the ability of our educational system to carry out its primary function” 
(Washington Post, 1975).
Student rights in public schools are not completely guaranteed by law; however, due to
many court precedents student rights have been established. Many other cases have
helped pave the road to how schools can discipline students.
Dixon V. Alabama State Board of Education (1961) dealt with a black college
student that participated in a “sit-in” at a white lunch counter. The student was not given
notice nor was there a hearing regarding the alleged violations (San Diego Law Review,
1975). Subsequent decisions have extended Dixon to high school suspensions. Williams
V. Dade Countv School Board (1971), Hobson v. Bailev (1970), and Vought v. Van
Buren Public Schools (1969), all proclaimed that students were arbitrarily suspended
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without the right to vocalize their side of the story and without prior notice of the 
allegations. Prior to 1969, the federal courts had not faced a short suspension case.
Dixon and its progeny had established procedural guidelines only for long or indefinite 
suspensions and expulsions, (Notre Dame Lawyer, 1974). Therefore, the Dixon Court set 
forth the following five standards, which it felt would decrease the possibility of arbitrary 
decisions and afford the student minimum due process protection;
1. Notice o f specific charges and grounds against the student.
2. A hearing, the nature of which should vary depending upon the circumstances 
of the particular case.
3. The student should be given the names of the witnesses against him and an 
oral or written report on the facts to which each witness testifies.
4. The student should be given the opportunity to present his own defense 
against the charges.
5. If the hearing is not before the Board directly, the results and findings of the 
hearing should be presented in a report open to the student (Dixon v. Alabama 
State Board of Education. 1961 P. 159).
A hearing should serve two functions. First, it should determine whether or not 
the student in fact did commit the alleged act. Second, it must designate appropriate 
discipline with regard to the degree of the committed offense (San Diego Law Review, 
1975). The student need not admit his wrongdoing for the fact-finding aspect of the 
hearing to become less important. As when the court in Bett v. Board of Education. Citv 
of Chicago (1972) stated: Since the student admitted setting false alarms (the misconduct 
with which she was charged) the function of procedural protection is insuring a fair and 
reliable determination of the retrospective factual question whether she in fact did it is not 
essential (Bett v. Board of Education. Citv of Chicago. 1972 P. 629).
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The 1969 federal decision, Baker v. Downey Citv Board of Education, was the 
first to directly confront a short suspension. Two students were placed on ten-day 
suspensions, without notice or hearing, for distributing a student publication named Oink. 
The Principal conferred with the students’ parents two days after the suspension had been 
applied. The court held that this post-suspension conference satisfied due process 
requirements. Baker failed to consider the possibility of procedures less demanding than 
the Dixon safeguards but more protective than the perfunctory post-suspension parental 
conference (Baker v. Downey Citv Board of Education. 1969). Madera v. Board of 
Education was cited for the proposition that due process procedures may vary according 
to the circumstances and that the right to counsel does not apply to school disciplinary 
hearings:
“Law and order in the classroom should be the responsibility of our respective 
educational systems. The courts should not usurp this function and turn 
disciplinary problems, involving suspensions, into criminal adversary proceedings 
-  which they definitely are not” (Madera v. Board o f Education. 1967 Pp. 788- 
789).
The classical situation arises when the violation of rules takes place in front of the
school official that maintains the authority and duty to discipline students. In this type of
instance, a determination of whether the student was involved in misconduct would be a
needless step in the disciplinary process. However, this is not the typical situation. More
often, the offense occurs in front of other students, which requires investigation on the
part of the administrator. Disciplinarians for the most part must seek out the student, in
order to obtain his side of the story and then render his decision on whether to suspend
the student or not. As was pointed out by the Court:
“Fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one sided determination of the facts 
decisive of rights... No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth
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than to give a person in jeopardy o f serious loss notice o f the case against him and 
opportunity to meet it” (Anti-Fascist Comm, v. McGrath. 1931 P. 123).
In Farrell v. Joel, high school students were placed on fifteen-day suspensions 
after participating in protests that revolved around prior school disciplinary actions. The 
students were warned that their activity violated school rules and if they continued in the 
protest they would be suspended. The facts surrounding the incident included; the 
removals from school were later reduced to ten-day suspensions, and there was no 
hearing prior to their dismissal. The court held that the circumstances surrounding the 
suspensions did not require notice or a prior hearing. Since the students knew that their 
conduct violated school rules, they had been previously warned, and a ten-day suspension 
was classified as a minor disciplinary action similar to staying after school and extra 
homework, which do not require formal procedures, the Court explained a prior hearing 
would have served no purpose except to set a penalty (Farrell v. Joel. 1971 P. 163).
In addition, a student who has been arrested by a court agency does not fulfill the 
student’s due process rights. Specifically, if  a student is suspended after being arrested 
on their way to school, the court system has the right to drop the charges, thereby, 
removing the sole evidence against the student in question and thus violating the student's 
due process rights. The accuracy of witnesses generally will raise issues, which can only 
be adequately tested if the accused student has an opportunity to present their side of the 
story (Strickland v. Inlow. 1973 P. 189).
Schools have tried to circumvent student due process rights by claiming that 
student due process rights fail to recognize emergency situations that may arise. A 
general principle of procedural due process is that the need for quick action by the state in
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serious emergency situations will overcome the individual interest in procedural 
protections (Board of Regents v. Roth. 1972 P. 577).
In Banks v. Board of Public Instruction, the Fifth Circuit Court considered The 
Dade County school regulation, which authorized a ten-day suspension without prior 
hearing (Banks v. Board o f Public Instruction. 1970). Although the court discussed 
Dixon, and decided that any and all suspensions required a hearing, it felt that in the 
matter of short suspensions a prior hearing would disrupt learning. This conclusion was 
reached through a discussion of hypothetical classroom misconduct. The discussion 
assumed extreme misconduct requiring immediate removal from school to maintain the 
learning environment. However, the Court did not acknowledge that severe misconduct 
justifies dispensing with a prior hearing even when normally required.
Banks avoided the primary question o f whether a prior hearing should be required 
in non-emergency situations. Similar incomplete analysis was afforded in Dunn v. Tvler 
Independent School District (1971, P. 530). Dunn was placed on a three-day suspension 
for involvement in riotous activity. Although the suspension could have been sustained 
on the act alone the court emphasized particular facts surrounding the incident.
Therefore, the applicability of the “emergency” exception was not explicitly recognized 
(Dunn V. Tvler Independent School District. 1971). Another Fifth Circuit case. Black 
Students ex rel. Shoemaker v. Williams (1970), acknowledged the relation o f due process 
protections to emergency situations (Black Students ex rel. Shoemaker v. Williams.
1970).
Black Students like Dixon considered a ten-day suspension to be substantial and 
cited Pervis v. LaMarque. which reminded that minimal punishment and emergency
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situations are the only exceptions to a prior hearing requirement. Therefore, Black 
Students is near the position that any suspension requires a prior hearing except in 
emergency situations (Black Students ex rel. Shoemaker v. Williams. 1970 P. 1215).
Determination as to whether due process applies to school discipline in 
emergency situations has been questioned for years. In 1943, the Fourteenth Amendment 
was applied to the States by protecting the citizen against the state itself and all o f its 
creatures -  Boards of Education not excepted (West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette. 1943 P. 637).
Benchmarks such as Mulane v. Central Hanover Trust Co. (1950) have given 
guidance as to what process is due. This particular case, often invoked by later opinions, 
said that, “Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the 
Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that 
deprivation o f life, liberty or property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing 
appropriate to the nature of the case.” Due process is a right that “has little reality or 
worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself 
whether to ... contest” (Mulane v. Central Hanover Trust Co.. 1950 P. 313).
Furthermore, “The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be 
heard” (Grannis v. Ordean. 1914 P. 394).
The Due Process Clause also forbids random deprivations of liberty. Satisfaction 
of the minimal requirements of the Clause was mandated in Wisconsin v. Constantineau 
(1971). “Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because 
of what the government is doing to him,” (Wisconsin v. Constantineau. 1971 P. 437).
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The courts have also determined that the length and consequent severity o f a
deprivation “is not decisive of the basic right” to a hearing o f some kind (Fuentes v.
Shevin. 1972 P. 86). “Education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
government” (Brown v. Board o f Education. 1954 P. 493). Thus, exclusion from the
educational process is a serious event in the life of a suspended child. The Court’s stance
has been that as long as a property deprivation occurs, its gravity is irrelevant to the
question of whether due process should be afforded.
“Fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts 
decisive o f rights...” “Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and self- 
righteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness. No better instrument 
has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious 
loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it” (Anti-Fascist 
Committee. 1951 Pp. 168 - 172).
Three different constitutional models o f hearings have emerged under Supreme 
Court decisions. The models diverge sharply in their procedural formalities:
1. Full dress due process. The accused has the right to a speedy and public trial by 
an impartial jury or judge, notice of the charges, to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses, to be present at trial, to retain counsel, protection against being 
put twice in jeopardy and a standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Medium due process. Some of the more formal manifestations of the criminal 
trial, such as the jury, complex rules of evidence, and stricter standards of proof 
are absent. The right to cross-examine is accorded but the Court’s attitude toward 
counsel is more ambivalent. Counsel need not be provided at the pre-termination 
stage, but the accused must he allowed to retain counsel if  so desired.
3. Skeletal due process. Rights to counsel and cross-examination are almost wholly 
absent. Skeletal due process contains only the barest rudiments: advance notice 
of the charges, a statement of the evidence backing them, some chance to present 
one’s own side of the story, and perhaps a brief statement o f reasons for the 
adverse action (Wilkinson III. 1975).
According to the Fourteenth Amendment, “No state shall deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” When a school administrator
26
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
disciplines a student as a result of misconduct, the school official is exercising “state” 
action, while the student would be the “person” being deprived of liberty and/or property. 
Deprivation of life is reserved to the criminal justice process and by government action 
and therefore is not relevant to this issue. According to William Buss, of the University 
of Iowa Law School, the due process clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment 
poses three distinct procedural due process issues:
(1) Is the claimant before the court entitled to any constitutionally 
required process at all?
(2) If  the claimant is entitled to any “due process,” when is that 
process due?
(3) At whatever time or times the constitutional protection attaches, what 
procedural safeguards does due process in fact require— what process is due? 
(Buss, William G., 1975)
If the individual deprivation is not o f “life, liberty, or property,” the individual has 
no constitutional right to any form o f due process protection; if  the interest is protected, 
some form of prior hearing is required” (Arnett v. Kennedy, 1974 P. 1650).
In Lopez v. Williams a number o f students were suspended from the Columbus, 
Ohio, public schools after being involved in a student demonstration during a time of 
racial tension in early 1971. The facts established that at least some of the students were 
suspended without any form o f hearing. The students gave testimony that they did not 
participate in the demonstration/misconduct and were subsequently suspended by 
administration. The suspensions were imposed under an Ohio statue, which authorized 
principals to impose suspensions up to ten-days without prior notice and hearing (Lopez 
V. Williams. 1974 P. 1299).
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The students claimed that they were denied their due process rights and filed suit
against the district. A three judge panel utilized the Supreme Court two-phase approach
and held that the statutory right to public education is a protected liberty requiring prior
hearing before deprivation thus, invalidating the Ohio statute. The Court weighed the
interest of school authorities in regulating discipline and declined to outline/specify a
precise form of hearing;
“If school administrators follow procedures, which result in a fair factual 
determination made after notice and an opportunity to defend against the charges 
of misconduct, then no matter how informal the procedure, the student has been 
accorded (due process)...” (Lopez v. Williams, 1974 P. 1291).
The decision also noted that students who committed serious disruptions could be
suspended without a prior hearing. It was also documented that when such situations
occur, an adversary hearing should be held within 72 hours after the infraction.
In opinions handed down in 1972, including Roth v. Board o f Regents (1972), the
Supreme Court developed a new approaeh to procedural due process cases (DuPriest,
Douglas M, 1977). It established a two-part analysis, determining first whether property
or liberty interest was involved in the dispute. If such interests were involved the Court
would decide how it should be protected. In Roth, the Court indicated that due process
protections couldn’t be invoked to protect a right guaranteed by one o f the first eight
amendments without an accompanying finding that a liberty or property interest is
involved (Roth v. Board of Regents. 1972 P. 577).
However, the nature and weight of the accused interests must be taken into
consideration when establishing whether or not due process is required. The factors
appropriate at one stage are intended to be exclusive of those at the other stage. In
Morrissev v. Brewer the Court used a two-part test that considered both the nature and
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the weight of the interest in determining whether a protected right existed. This approach 
is more tenable than that espoused in Roth. It is impossible to wholly separate values of 
quality and quantity. “Some valuing is inevitably necessary to determine if a particular 
limitation of freedom rises to the level of a fourteenth amendment deprivation o f liberty” 
(Notre Dame Law. 1975).
The Supreme Court’s analytical framework was first applied to public school 
suspensions in Vail v. Board o f Education, when Vail held that access to education itself 
is a protected property interest. Any suspension greater than five days required the 
safeguards established in Dixon. Vail with the possible exception of Black Students, is 
the furthest extension of Dixon to short suspensions, by complying with the dictates of 
Roth, which mandates some form of hearing before any suspension (Vail v. Board of 
Education. 1973).
The “informal administrative consultation” allows for satisfaction of due process
by requiring in order that:
“ .. .the student can know why he is being disciplined and so that the student can 
have the opportunity to persuade the school official that the suspension is not 
justified, e.g., that this is a situation of mistaken identity or that there is some 
other compelling reason not to take action” (Vail v. Board o f Education. 1973 P. 
603).
Several Supreme Court cases have determined that public education is a 
guaranteed “liberty.” Eighty years ago the Court held that liberty, “includes... not 
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual ... to acquire 
useful knowledge ...” (Mever v. Nebraska. 1923 P. 399). A few years later in Pierce v. 
Societv o f Sisters the Court reaffirmed by stating that, “the liberty of parents and 
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control” is 
protected by due process (Pierce v. Societv of Sisters. 1928 Pp. 534 - 535).
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Therefore, the Court supported Lopez on the constitutional status o f public 
education, but could not support on the hold that only long and not short suspensions 
from school are protected interests. In Fuentes v. Shevin it was held that, “While the 
length and consequent severity of a deprivation may be another factor to weigh in 
determining the appropriate form of hearing, it is not decisive o f the basic right to a prior 
hearing of some kind” (Fuentes v. Shevin, 1972 P. 86).
In Lopez v. Williams (1974) it was concluded that “Weight” only pertains to the 
first-phase analysis of any incident. The valuing of a liberty after the misconduct has 
been determined is to decide if it deserves fourteenth amendment status. As Judge 
Kinneary stated:
“If education is a protected liberty when expulsion is involved, then it remains a 
liberty when suspension occurs. The right to an education is the interest being 
afforded procedural protection. It either is, or is not a liberty under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The difference between expulsion and suspension becomes 
important only when the Court confronts the question o f what process is due to 
protect the Fourteenth Amendment liberty” (Lopez v. Williams. 1974 P. 1300).
Student interest in being suspended has been argued throughout the years.
Society clearly places high value on education as indicated by the compulsory attendance
laws. The interest of the student is to avoid the harm that could occur from being
excluded from school. In Shanlev v. Northeast Independent School Dist.. it was held
that:
“The ‘magnitude’ o f a penalty should be gauged by its effect upon the student and 
not simply meted out by formula. For example, a suspension of even one hour 
could be quite critical to an individual student if  that hour encompassed a final 
examination that provided for no ‘make-up” (Shanlev v. Northeast Independent 
School Dist.. 1972 P. 967).
Others have argued that the collateral damage to the student is more significant than the
academic harm. Suspensions generally become part of a student’s permanent records and
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may effect their admission into higher learning or their employment in the future. 
Furthermore, suspensions may also cause psychological harm from the stigmatization of 
a school suspension as indicated in Lopez when psychologists testified that, “suspensions 
cause lowered self-esteem, resentment o f school authorities, and withdrawal” (Lopez v. 
Williams, 1974).
In Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, the Court indicated that;
“Suspension is a particularly humiliating punishment evoking images of the 
public penitent of medieval Christendom and colonial Massachusetts, the outlaw 
of the American West, and the ostracized citizen of classical Athens. Suspension 
is an officially-sanctioned judgment that a student be for some period removed 
beyond the pale” (Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District. 1971 P.
1172).
Banks v. Board of Public Instruction elaborated on the discussion of classroom 
misconduct and prior hearings. The court held that; “If student misconduct is so severe 
that learning can be maintained only by immediate removal from school, extreme 
physical violence for instance, a prior hearing is dispensable even if  normally required” 
(Banks v. Board o f Public Instruction. 1970 P. 296). Classroom misconduct is generally 
not as bad as Banks assumed and very seldom does it require the instantaneous removal 
of a student from school. Generally, when a student misbehaves in class and does not 
respond to the teacher’s interventions the student is sent to an administrative office. The 
administrator will then take into account prior incidents and the severity of the incident at 
hand. A suspension may occur, however, the administrator has the chance to have the 
student understand that the suspension has been judiciously imposed. By means of this 
type of informal due process the student is less likely to suffer psychological harm and 
more likely to reevaluate his conduct (O’Toole, 1972).
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The Court’s phrase “ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process,” has also 
been scrutinized. The problem is that not all administrators or teachers view similar 
behaviors as being dismptive in nature. In Hawkins v. Coleman, students alleged that the 
school’s suspension policy was being administered in a racially discriminatory manner. 
Two experts testified and one found that the ethnicity o f black students was the sole 
reason that students were being suspended. Specifically he stated, “There was a 
substantial reliance upon non-violent “offenses” as a justification for suspension when, in 
fact, such conduct may be a pivotal ethnic characteristic” (Hawkins v. Coleman. 1974 P. 
1335). The second expert concluded that in schools where there is institutional racism 
toward Blacks:
“Conduct by black students that would not be “unusual” or “offensive” in a black 
environment becomes to many teachers as being “disruptive” or suspendable 
conduct.” To teachers with Blacks, this conduct, that is non-violent and 
characteristic of the black race, stands out and becomes thereby subject to 
selective prosecution (Hawkins v. Coleman. 1974 P. 1336).
The qualification of any incident being deemed as an “ongoing threat” is dependent on
the view of the teacher and the administration and therefore is susceptible to the same
kind of judicial reasoning as “continuing danger” (Hawkins v. Coleman. 1974 P. 1336).
Brief o f Goss v. Lopez 
Case
Goss V. Lopez. 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975)
Procedural Setting
U.S. Supreme Court
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Facts
In Ohio, during the early 1970’s, the state’s compulsory attendance law required 
children to attend school and established education as a right for all students within the 
appropriate age range. This provided the basis for the plaintiffs in Goss to argue that they 
had been deprived of their property interest, which was guaranteed by state law, of an 
education. Ohio law also allowed students to be suspended up to ten days without any 
procedural safeguards.
The storm of student protest movements was clearly gaining speed in the 1960’s 
and during the ’Vietnam War on college campuses. By the early 1970’s the widespread 
student unrest had spread to many high schools. Nine students alleged that they were 
suspended from school for up to 10 days without a hearing (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 Pp. 730 
-731).
Six o f the plaintiffs, Rudolph Sutton, Susan Cooper, Deborah Fox, Tyrone 
Washington, Bruce Harris, and Clarence Byars, were students at the Marion-Franklin 
High School. These six students were suspended for disruptive and disobedient conduct 
committed in the presence of the school administrator who ordered the suspension. 
Specifically, Tyrone Washington began to demonstrate in the school auditorium while a 
class was being conducted. The school principal directed him to leave. Washington 
refused and was subsequently suspended. As a police officer was trying to remove 
Washington, Rudolph Sutton physically attacked the police officer in front of the 
Principal and was also suspended (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 732).
Around the same time, Dwight Lopez, Betty Crome and seventy-five other public 
school students were suspended from school in Columbus, Ohio. It was reported that the
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students caused a disturbance and then destroyed school property at Central High School. 
Dwight Lopez contended that he did not participate in the disruption. Many of the 
students did not participate in the protest but were nonetheless suspended for being 
present at the demonstration. The suspended students did not receive hearings before 
their suspensions were imposed, though some o f the students and their parents met in 
informal conferences with school officials at a later date. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P.733) 
Betty Crome was at a demonstration at a school other than her own. She was 
arrested, taken to the police station, and then released without being charged. Crome 
received a notice of suspension the following day. School administrators did not testify 
in front of the Court with respect to the Lopez and Crome suspensions. Therefore, the 
record did not show why the decision to suspend was made. It was clear that no hearing 
was ever held for either student (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 733).
Carl Smith, the ninth named plaintiff, was also suspended in a similar fashion.
His disciplinary file did not contain information with regard to his suspension. 
Furthermore, school officials did not testify as to the reason for the suspension.
Holding
District Court
The District Court found in favor o f the Plaintiffs.
Supreme Court
The Supreme Court also found in favor of the Plaintiffs, however, the Supreme Court 
removed various restrictions, such as timelines, created by the District Court.
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Rationale of Holding
District Court
Students challenged their discipline in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District o f  Ohio, Eastern Division (372 F. Supp. 1279). In the District Court’s 
decision, a three-judge panel overturned the disciplinary action and established a three­
pronged standard o f due process. The first requirement, according to the District Court, 
only permitted the immediate removal of a student whose conduct “disrupts the academic 
atmosphere of the school, endangers fellow students, teachers, or school officials, or 
damages property.” The District Court declared that there were “minimum requirements 
of notice and a hearing prior to suspension, except in an emergency situation.” The 
District Court stated that relevant case authority would:
“(1) permit immediate removal of a student whose conduct disrupts the academic 
atmosphere of the school, endangers fellow students, teachers or school officials, 
or damages property; (2) require notice of suspension proceedings to be sent to 
the student's parents within 24 hours o f the decision to conduct them; and (3) 
require a hearing to be held, with the student present, within 72 hours of his 
removal.” Finally, the Court stated that, “during the required hearing, the school 
administrator must provide ‘statements in support of the charge,’ and, “the student 
and others be permitted to make statements in defense or mitigation” (Goss v. 
Lopez. 1975 P. 735).
The decision of the court was based upon the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
constitutional guarantee of due process rights. According to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
“nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” (U.S. 
Constitution, 14*'’ Amendment). Finally, the District Court held that in some instances in 
which prior notice and hearing were not feasible and the immediately removed student 
should be given necessary notice of hearing as soon as practicable. Subsequently, the
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District Court judges ordered that all references to the suspensions be removed from all 
o f the Plaintiffs’ records.
The Supreme Court
Various administrators of the Columbus, Ohio, Public School System challenged 
the judgment of the three-judge federal court by filing a petition of certiorari with the 
Supreme Court. The petition for certiorari was granted and the Court scheduled oral 
arguments to begin on October 14, 1974. The main arguments raised by various 
administrators of the Columbus, Ohio, Public School System included;
1. Attendance at public school was a privilege.
2. Administrators could withdraw students at will.
3. School Authorities stand in loco parentis to the student and thereby, have full 
parental discretion in matters o f discipline (Oral Arguments, 1971).
The Supreme Court decided that the students in Goss had been deprived o f their 
property interest of an education and their liberty interest had also been impacted due to 
the damage to their reputations by having a suspension placed in their school records and 
their potential standing with future teachers. Once this was decided, the Court set about 
determining what level of due process a student who may be subjected to disciplinary 
action by a school administrator deserves. The Court handed down its decision January 
o f 1975 that students facing suspension, “Must be given some kind of notice and afforded 
some kind of hearing,” before being deprived of their education (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 
738).
The decision of the Court established that due process was due; however, the 
amount of due process for students determined by the Court was limited. Goss focused 
on the distinction between fundamental rights and due process liberties. Goss concluded 
that Rodriguez does not control the first-phase analysis. Rodriguez endorsed the
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statement in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) that, “education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments” (San Antonio Independent School 
Dist. V. Rodriguez, 1973). Therefore, denying due process protection in public education 
cannot be justified when concerted with less elevated interests (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 
737).
The Goss Court failed to specify the mildest form o f suspension that would 
invoke due process and only generally described the type of notice and hearing required. 
While this deliberate redaction of specificity should not cause many problems, the 
Court’s statement of the situations where immediate removal without prior notice and 
hearing could be troublesome. Although Goss did state that in cases of immediate 
suspension, a hearing should follow “as soon as practicable.”
According to the Goss decision, school administrators are required to give a 
student notice of the accusation made against him/her and the student must be provided 
an opportunity to respond and give the disciplinarian their own version of the events 
which may have occurred. The Court stopped short of allowing a formal hearing with the 
cross-examination of witnesses due to the logistical intrusion this would create on the 
normal operation of schools (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 741).
The school also has an interest in student suspensions. School administrators, are 
mandated to maintain the educational atmosphere in the schools. Therefore, 
administrators require broad authority to control student conduct and have an interest in 
avoiding restrictions, which could hamper their ability to respond to varying disciplinary 
problems. The courts felt that if  the procedures outlined in Dixon were to be followed for 
all suspensions, the procedures themselves would be more disruptive than the incidents.
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Therefore, Vail required administrative consultation in an informal manner for 
suspensions shorter than six days (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 740).
The Court then referred to Wood v. Strickland (1975), which dictated, “that the 
plaintiff must have a ‘specific’ property interest in interscholastic high school 
competition.” Since Goss spoke of a “total exclusion from the educational process,” and 
while the Court conceded that interscholastic athletics could be a benefit of education, the 
Court decided that a property interest was created only in “participation in the entire 
process” (Dallam v. Cumberland Valiev School District, 1975 P. 361). Education is 
formulated on the basis that all activities culminate into the educational process.
Dissenting/Concurring Opinions
Maioritv Opinion
According to Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion, Ohio law provided
for a free education and also allowed for a principal of an Ohio public school to suspend
a pupil for misconduct for up to 10 days without a hearing or to expel him. Furthermore,
the principal must notify the parent within 24-hours of the removal from school. A pupil
or parent of a pupil that is recommended for expulsion has the right to appeal to the
Board of Education. The Board also had the right to reinstate such student. Justice
White noted that Columbus, Ohio Public School System was devoid o f any written
procedure applicable to suspensions. Additionally, Justice White declared,
“[MJany school authorities may well prefer the untrammeled power to act 
unilaterally, unhampered by rules about notice and hearing. But it would be a 
strange disciplinary system in an educational institution if no communication was 
sought by the disciplinarian with the student in an effort to inform him of his 
dereliction and to let him tell his side of the story in order to make sure that an 
injustice is not done. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 739)”
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Even when the disciplinarian is the person who witnessed the misbehavior of the student, 
which had necessitated the suspension, Justice White insisted that the student was still 
entitled to notice and a hearing. “The student will at least have the opportunity to 
characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper context” (Goss v. Eopez, 
1975 P. 739).
Dissenting Opinion
Although five of the Justices concurred with the Plaintiffs, Justice Powell, who 
wrote the dissenting opinion, vocalized his concern that schools should be run and 
governed by the experts, school officials. Justice Powell, with whom The Chief Justice, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined, in his dissenting opinion, 
warned, “no one can foresee the ultimate frontiers of the new ‘thicket’ the Court now 
enters.”
This potential ‘thicket’ of micromanagement of the nation’s public schools by the 
Courts necessitated changes in school district’s policies and regulations as well as laws 
governing the disciplining of students in each state throughout the country. Justice 
Powell offered the following as part o f his dissent;
“The Court today invalidates an Ohio statute that permits student suspensions 
from school without a hearing “for not more than ten days.” The decision 
unnecessarily opens avenues for judicial intervention in the operation of our 
public schools that may affect adversely the quality o f education. The Court 
holds for the first time that the federal courts, rather than educational officials and 
state legislatures, have the authority to determine the rules applicable to routine 
classroom discipline o f children and teenagers in the public schools. It justifies 
this unprecedented intrusion into the process of elementary and secondary 
education by identifying a new constitutional right: the right o f a student not to be 
suspended for as much as a single day without notice and a due process hearing 
either before or promptly following the suspension. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 741)”
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Justice Powell continued by stating,
’’The Court’s decision rests on the premise that, under Ohio law, education is a 
property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
and therefore that any suspension requires notice and a hearing. In my view, a 
student’s interest in education is not infringed by a suspension within the limited 
period prescribed by Ohio law. Moreover, to the extent that there may be some 
arguable infringement, it is too speculative, transitory, and insubstantial to justify 
imposition of a constitutional rule. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 742)”
Justice Powell’s dissent followed the two-step analysis of Roth. Powell
emphasized that property interests “are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law”
(Board of Regents v. Roth, 1972). Furthermore, since the Ohio statue which created the
student’s property right also defined its limitations by giving the principal power to
suspend students.
Therefore, Ohio legislature had made the student’s right and the principal’s right 
inseparable. Additionally, to ignore the limitation placed upon the student’s right was to 
disregard the clear intent o f the legislature. Finally, Justice Powell declared that a ten- 
day suspension hardly constituted a “grievous loss.” Since the appellees’ grades had not 
suffered from the ten-day suspensions, there was no serious deprivation of the students’ 
entitlement to education (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 742).
Scholarlv Commentary
Various administrators o f the Columbus, Ohio, Public School System challenged 
the judgment o f the three-judge federal court by filing an appeal with the Supreme Curt 
of the United States. The Goss v. Lopez Court rejected the view that attendance at public 
school was a privilege, the policy that administrators could withdraw students at will, and
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the notion that school authorities stand in loco parentis to the student and thereby, have 
full parental discretion in matters of discipline (Wilkinson III, 1975).
The arguments in the judicial process that influenced the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision involved the type of deprivations that incurred, specifically, short term 
suspensions and suspensions that occurred when the administrator saw the incident and 
did not allow the perpetrator to tell his side o f the story. If  the individual deprivation is 
not o f “life, liberty, or property,” the individual has no constitutional right to any form of 
due process protection. “If the interest is protected, then some form of prior hearing is 
required” (Arnett v. Kennedv. 1974 P. 1650). In Ohio, during the early 1970’s, the 
state’s compulsory attendance law required ehildren to attend school and established 
education as a right for all students within the appropriate age range. This provided the 
basis for the plaintiffs in Goss to argue that they had been deprived of their property 
interest, which was guaranteed by state law, of an education. Ohio law also allowed 
students to be suspended up to ten days without any procedural safeguards.
The narrow, 5-4, decision fundamentally changed the way school administrators 
were able to discipline students. It also presented a significant change that needed to be 
made among school administrators regarding their perceptions o f the constitutional rights 
of students while at school as the ruling to expunge the Plaintiffs’ records reflected. 
Furthermore, the Court held that students facing suspension, “Must be given some kind 
of notice and afforded some kind of hearing,” before being deprived of their education 
(Ruetter, Edmund E. JR., 1982). Therefore, since property interest could not he 
established, the plaintiffs rights were not violated and the case was subsequently 
dismissed. If argument had been made where the plaintive disputed his liberty interest by
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making a case that showed the denial of a year of interscholastic athletics affected his 
opportunity to attend college or damaged his self-esteem, then the student may have 
prevailed.
Outline of Law
Case Law
“The purpose of researching the law is to ascertain the legal eonsequences of a 
specific set of actual or potential facts” (Wren & Wren, 1986). The legal system of the 
United States is based upon the common law of England. Common law is based on a 
system of rights and most of the law is created by judges. As the law grows, courts are 
faced with interpreting laws by applying them to specific circumstances. Accordingly, in 
some instances the courts may modify the jurisprudence. Rights are an abstract concept 
which may provide to be very confusing however, the basic idea is straightforward. 
Rights are thought of as domains in which people may act freely without harassment 
from other individuals with differing opinions (Federal Judiciary, 2002).
Court System
The court system in the United States is comprised of a variety of courts 
throughout the land. Specifically, each o f the states and territories operates as an 
independent entity. Thus each state has different court structures and laws. Above all of 
these courts sits the federal government, which also has its own laws and courts. A 
further complication is that the courts often overlap and parties have the choice as to
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which court to file their dispute in. Federal courts are often called upon to apply state law 
and state courts similarly must apply federal law (Federal Judiciary, 2002).
There are two types of courts in the United States. The Trial Courts consider 
evidence, listen to testimony, and decide facts. After the Trial Court has made a decision, 
the losing party may be able to appeal the decision to an Appeals Court. In an Appeals 
Court, one party presents arguments supporting the decision of the Trial Court while the 
other party makes an argument asking the court to change the previous decision. Most 
cases are not granted the opportunity to an appeal. Usually, an appeal is only possible 
when there is a claim that the Trial Court has committed an error o f law. Error of law 
occurs when the judge makes a mistake as the law applicable in the case. An example of 
error of law is when the judge gives the wrong instructions to the jury or permits 
evidence that should not have been allowed. When an Appeals Court issues a ruling, the 
opinion of the court sets a precedent for similar cases in the future. However, a court in 
another area or a higher court can disagree with the previously set precedent (Arbetman, 
1990).
Federal Courts
"The United States district courts are the trial courts of the federal court system. 
Within limits set by Congress and the Constitution, the district courts have jurisdiction to 
hear nearly all categories of federal cases, including hoth civil and criminal matters.
There are 94 federal judicial districts, including at least one district in each state, the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Three territories o f the United States — the Virgin 
Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands — have district courts that hear federal
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cases, including bankruptcy cases” (Federal Judiciary, 2002). District courts are divided 
into eleven separate sections throughout the United States and its territories.
“The 94 U.S. judicial districts are organized into 12 regional circuits, each of 
which has a United States court of appeals. A court of appeals hears appeals from the 
district courts located within its circuit, as well as appeals from decisions o f federal 
administrative agencies. In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
nationwide jurisdiction to hear appeals in specialized cases, such as those involving 
patent laws and cases decided by the Court of International Trade and the Court of 
Federal Claims” (Federal Judiciary, 2002). Appeal courts are very different from the 
district courts. The primary purpose of an appeal court is to correct legal mistakes, not 
rehear the facts. As a result the appeal courts main function is to rule on mistakes made 
by the judges regarding the law (Federal Judiciary, 2002).
United States Courts of Appeals and District Courts Geographic Boundaries
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The highest court of the land is the Supreme Court. “The United States Supreme 
Court consists of the Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate justices. At its 
discretion, and within certain guidelines established by Congress, the Supreme Court 
each year hears a limited number of the cases it is asked to decide. Those cases may 
begin in the federal or state courts, and they usually involve important questions about 
the Constitution or federal law” (Federal Judiciary, 2002). The Supreme Court hears 
very few cases compared to the lower courts. Furthermore, the United States Supreme 
Court may hear disputes from either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. The 
Supreme Court plays an important role in shaping our laws and protecting our rights. 
Under American political theory of judicial review, the Supreme Court has the power to 
interpret laws passed by legislature and declare them null and void if  it finds that those 
laws created conflict with State or Federal Constitution. Therefore, many of the cases 
decided by the Supreme Court are far more important to society than the individual 
matter being litigated (Federal Judiciary, 2002).
Nine justices hear and decide all cases before the U.S. Supreme Court and a 
majority rules. When all of the judges cannot agree on a decision, two or more written 
opinions may be issued. The majority opinion states the decision of the court while the 
dissenting opinion states the reasons for the disagreement. Furthermore, judges agreeing 
with the decision, but for a different reason, may write a concurring opinion (Arbetman, 
1990). A decision made in the Supreme Court is considered final and binding with no 
other avenue of appeal once a decision is rendered. This study focused on federal law in 
the various federal District Courts, Appeal Courts, and Supreme Court.
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Federal Cases Local Cases
Summary
In its landmark Goss v. Lopez decision, the Supreme Court established that 
students are entitled to due process procedural safeguards when facing a suspension from 
school. Chapter two outlined the jurisprudence that preceded Goss v. Lopez. An 
overview of the law and literature in place before and during the Goss litigation was 
provided. Additionally, Goss v. Lopez was analyzed and briefed. Specifically, the facts, 
holding, and rationale of the holding were presented. Furthermore, Justice White’s 
opinion and the dissenting opinion, written by Justice Powell, were examined. Finally, 
scholarly commentary and an outline of the Federal Court System were offered. Chapter 
Three will present the research design and methodology utilized in this study.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction
Chapter three is a description of the research design and methodology 
incorporated into this work, thereby outlining a review of implementation and application 
of procedural due process required by Goss v. Lopez. Specifically, chapter three outlines 
the method in which data was collected, disaggregated, and prepared for application to 
several questions relating to public school education and due process rights. Briefing 
the cases was the main technique utilized for gathering information in this study. 
“Briefing cases can serve as an important analytical tool, especially for beginning legal 
researchers (Wren & Wren, 1986).” “The art of taking notes on court decisions has been 
refined over the years into a widely accepted technique, called ‘briefing,’ which serves 
both as an efficient means of recording notes and as an additional analytical tool (Wren & 
Wren, 1986).” Furthermore, the purpose of this study was to investigate due process law 
by analyzing all Federal Case Law subsequent to Goss v. Lopez, Nevada Revised Statues, 
and Clark County School District Policies and Regulations as they pertain to public 
school students.
Methodology
In this study a specific methodology was utilized. The study conducted was a 
qualitative analysis of the impact o f the Goss v. Lopez decision. The study included a
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comprehensive survey o f the related literature, a review of rulings from the various 
federal courts— district, circuit, and supreme— as well as an analysis o f the Nevada 
Revised Statutes and the Clark County School District Policies and Regulations. The 
cases were studied for patterns contained therein. Those patterns were examined for 
application and interpretation with regard to Goss v. Lopez. When applicable to Goss the 
page numbers quoted from Goss refer to the associated pages in Appendix A. Nevada 
Revised Statutes and Clark County School District Regulations and Policies were 
scrutinized in order to determine if they adhered to the jurisprudence of Goss. Finally, 
interpretation and application o f Goss v. Lopez was administered in order to answer the 
research questions raised by the review of literature.
Examination of the Clark County Law Library and UNLV’s William S. Boyd 
Law School’s library, indexes of legal periodicals, revealed many sources for the 
literature review. Case law and law journal databases on the Lexis service at the School 
of Business at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas was utilized to provide additional 
information. On-line journals, journal articles available through the Educational 
Resources Information Center (ERIC), W est’s Education Law Reporter, Education Law 
and related textbooks were reviewed to supplement current literature. Furthermore, 
“Blacks Law” was utilized to define the definitions of selected words, phrases, and legal 
terms.
The following procedure was followed in order to identify appropriate cases for 
analysis. First, the Goss case was “Shepardized.” “Shepardizing” a case is a process that 
involves the manipulation of a computerized database of United States case law in order
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to extract a listing o f all subsequent cases that have cited Goss v. Lopez. The process 
revealed 2,492 federal and state cases which cited Goss v. Lopez since 1975.
Second, each o f the nearly 2,500 cases was reviewed individually in order to 
determine applicability to the study. For example, cases decided outside the federal 
courts and those taking place outside an educational setting were discarded. Specifically, 
thousands of cases merely cited Goss but had no relevance to the study. This sifting 
process sorted each of the cases into relevant and irrelevant groupings, thereby leaving 
136 cases to be considered for study. Next, an additional forty-two cases that were 
outside the K-12 spectrum or in the private sector were removed from consideration, with 
the exception of one higher education case that was particularly relevant to this study 
(Board of Curators, Univ. of MO v. Horowitz. 1978).
Of the 94 remaining cases another eight were also removed from consideration, 
since they were not directly related with procedural due process or did not provide 
instructive analysis on the subject of procedural due process as it relates to Goss v. Lopez 
(e.g. Special Education due process). Finally, the 86 cases that remained were examined 
for relevance.
Each of the remaining eighty-six cases were briefed, with respect to the following 
categories; citation, procedural setting, facts, holding, rationale of holding, and if 
applicable the concurring and / or dissenting opinions offered by the court. Specifically, 
the name of the case and procedural setting, i.e. Goss v. Lopez 95 S. Ct. 729, were listed. 
Next the facts as they related to Goss v. Lopez were explained in narrative form. The 
holding, (who the court ruled for) and the rationale of the holding, (why the court ruled in
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favor of one party) were detailed. Finally, if  applicable, the concurring and / or 
dissenting opinions o f the court were reported.
“Briefing” the cases provided an analytical synopsis in standard form which, 
allowed for the disclosure of emerging patterns and the various courts’ standard modus o f  
operandi. Each o f the cases was documented in chapter four by chronological order and 
by jurisdiction, (E.g. Supreme Court, E* Circuit, Circuit, etc...). Goss v. Lopez was 
applied to each case, thus revealing even more patterns as well as emerging / confusing 
questions to be considered and analyzed.
Summary
Chapter three explained the means and methods utilized to explore the 
jurisprudence o f Goss v. Lopez. Specifically, the process in which federal Case Law, 
Nevada Revised Statutes, and Clark County School District Policies and Regulations 
were obtained, disaggregated, and prepared for inclusion in the study were outlined. 
Furthermore, it documented the various resources that were examined with regard to due 
process in public schools and relevance to the Clark County School District and Nevada 
Law as they pertain to the precedent set forth in Goss v. Lopez. Chapter Four will outline 
the findings o f the study. More speeifically, it will present case law, Nevada Revised 
Statutes, Clark County School District Policy, and Clark County School District 
Regulations as they pertain to Goss v. Lopez.
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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
Introduction
Eighty-six federal cases, Goss v. Lopez (Appendix A), CCSD Policy and 
Regulations (Appendices B-F), and Nevada Revised Statutes (Appendix K) became the 
focus of this study. Each of the court cases examined fell into the parameters of K -  12 
public education and each had an alleged complaint of procedural due process violation. 
Furthermore, each of the court cases was examined to determine the facts, procedural 
setting, holding, rationale, and minority opinions. The cases were organized by 
jurisdiction in chronological order and placed into sub-categorical order within each 
federal circuit beginning with the Supreme Court then the First Circuit and ending with 
the Eleventh Circuit. The Nevada Revised Statutes and Clark County School District 
Regulations and Policies that pertained to due process were examined and summarized 
and then categorized at the end of the Ninth Circuit, since Nevada is bound by Ninth 
Circuit jurisprudence.
Case Law (Supreme Court)
Case
Wood V. Strickland. 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975)
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Procedural Setting
U.S. Supreme Court
Facts
Students enrolled at an Arkansas high school were expelled from school after they 
violated a school regulation that prohibited them from using or possession intoxicating 
beverages at school or school activities. Specifically, the students were charged with 
“spiking” the punch that was served at a meeting. It seems that a girl drove across state 
lines to procure the alcohol since the county in which she resided was “dry.” Although 
there were no apparent effects of the “spiked punch,” ten days later a teacher heard and 
then questioned the girls about the punch. At first they denied any involvement and then 
later admitted to it. The three girls then admitted their participation to Principal Waller 
who subsequently suspended them from school for ten school days. Shortly after. Waller 
decided to expel the girls. The School Board upheld the recommendation and voted to 
expel the girls for the remainder of the semester.
The school regulation in which the girls were suspended for violating, prohibited 
students from the use or possession of intoxicating beverages, was linked to the definition 
of “intoxicating liquor” under Arkansas statues. Those statutes, by weight, did not 
include beer, which is the beverage the girls spiked the punch with. Furthermore, the 
adoption of the regulation was to be applied to include beer. The District Court however, 
indicated in its instructions that the question of the proper construction of the regulation 
would not be relevant if  the jury found that the school officials in good faith considered 
the malt liquor and punch to fall within the regulation. The Court of Appeals ruled that
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the Defendants had the authority to prohibit the use and possession of alcoholic 
beverages or to continue its policy o f only prohibiting intoxicating beverages.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Goss by stating;
“Consider, for example, the recent five-to-four decision in Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U.S. 565 (1975), holding that a junior high school pupil routinely suspended for 
as much as a single day is entitled to due process. I suggest that most lawyers and 
judges would have thought, prior to that decision, that the law to the contrary was 
settled, indisputable, and unquestioned.
The Court's rationale in Goss suggests, for example, that school officials may 
infringe a student's right to education if  they place him in a noncollege- 
preparatory track or deny him promotion with his class without affording a due 
process hearing. See 419 U.S., at 597-599 (POWELL, J., dissenting). Does this 
mean that school officials who fail to provide such hearings in the future will be 
liable under § 1983 if a court subsequently determines that they were required? 
(Wood v. Strickland. 1975 P. 1004)”
Holding
The judgment o f the Court of Appeals was vacated and the case remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court.
Rationale of Holding 
The District Court ruled in favor of the Defendants on the ground that, absent 
proof o f malice, the defendants were immune from damage suits. The Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Cireuit, finding that the facts showed a violation of the students’ rights to 
“substantive due process,” reversed and remanded for appropriate injunctive relief and a 
new trial on the question of damages. Soon after, this suit was heard on certiorari in the 
United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that in the specific context of school discipline, school 
officials are not immune from liability for damages if the school officials knew or should 
have known that the actions would violate the constitutional rights o f the students.
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Certiorari was granted to consider whether the application o f due process governing 
immunity for school board members from liability for compensatory damages was the 
correct one. Therefore, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Goss by allowing the disciplinary 
action, due to the fact that the girls had been informed o f the charges against them and 
provided an opportunity to respond.
Dissent/Concurring Opinions 
Judge Justice Powell, with Chief Justice Blackmun and Judge Rehnquist, 
concurred in part and dissented in part with the ruling. They agreed that the judgment of 
the court of Appeals should have been vacated and the case remanded. They also 
dissented, with regard to the portion o f the case that appeared to impose a higher standard 
of care upon public school officials than that which is required of any other official.
Case
Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, (1977)
Procedural Setting
U.S. Supreme Court
Facts
The complaint alleged that a violation of both Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
Rights had been violated when the plaintiffs children were paddled. They contended 
that the plaintiffs were paddled without prior notice and hearing and that the paddlings 
were so severe as to keep one of the plaintiffs out of school for eleven days and to 
deprive the other plaintiff of the full use of his arm for a week. Specifically, Ingram 
presented testimony from sixteen students that suggested that because he was slow in 
responding to his teacher’s instructions, was subjected to “more than 20 licks” with a
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paddle while being held over the Principal’s desk. The paddling was so severe that he 
suffered a hematoma requiring medical attention, which kept him out o f school for 
several days. Andrews claimed that he was paddled several times for minor infractions. 
On two occasions he was struck on his arms, once depriving him of the full use of his 
arm for a week.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, in the Supreme Court on appeal from the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals who initially was inclined to reverse the Fifth Circuit 
District Court’s decision to dismiss the complaint, holding that there was no 
constitutional basis for relief. Flowever, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals eventually 
upheld the initial decision by ruling in favor of the Defendants.
Holding
On Certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s 
decision to dismiss the complaint. In an opinion by Powell, J., joined by Burger, Ch. J., 
and Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., it was held that the disciplinaiy paddling of 
public school students did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment, and that due process was not due, because “no state-created interest 
in liberty going beyond the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection o f freedom from bodily 
restraint and corporal punishment is involved with regard to corporal punishment of a 
public school student” (US L Ed Digest, Constitutional Law 527, 803.5; Schools 1).
Rationale of Holding
The United States Supreme Court affirmed that the disciplinary paddling of public 
school students did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
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Amendment since it did not violate the jurisprudence set forth in Goss v. Lopez. The
Supreme Court found;
“although corporal punishment in public schools implicated a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, nevertheless the due process clause did not require prior notice and a 
hearing before the disciplinary paddling of a student, since (a) the traditional 
common law remedies preserved under state law were fully adequate to afford 
due process, particularly when considered in light of the openness of the school 
environment, and (b) even if the need for advance procedural safeguards were 
clear, imposing a constitutional requirement of prior notice and a hearing would 
significantly burden the use o f corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure and 
would entail a significant intrusion into an area of primary educational 
responsibility, whereas the risk o f error that might result in violation o f a student's 
substantive rights could only be regarded as minimal, in view of the low incidence 
of abuse of corporal punishment by school authorities, the openness of the public 
schools, and the common law safeguards. (Ingraham v. Wright. 1977 P. 1402)”
Therefore, the Court affirmed and re-defined Goss when it sided for the Defendants. The
Court affirmed the process that is due for disciplinary actions. However, by
acknowledging that the intent of Goss was for disciplinary actions that deprive of life,
liberty, or property interests it redefined the utilization o f the precedent by limiting Goss
to only such deprivations. It should also be noted that although procedural due process is
not guaranteed by law in corporal process cases, if  corporal punishment is so harsh then
substantive due process may become necessary, per the Fourteenth Amendment.
Dissent/Concurring Opinions 
White, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ, dissented. They 
expressed the view that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment should not be restricted to those convicted o f crimes, but should also prohibit 
all “barbaric punishments.” White further contended that disciplinary spanking of school 
children was in fact “punishment” which was covered by the Eighth Amendment
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notwithstanding that schools were open institutions subject to public scrutiny or that
adequate state remedies were available to school children.
White continued by stating that while not every instance o f  spanking was
prohibited, it is necessary to provide minimal due process between the student and
disciplinarian since the student could not recover when the punishment resulted from a
reasonable, good faith mistake in the school disciplinary process. With regard to due
process claims, White stated in his dissenting opinion;
“the availability of a tort action for "excessive" punishment did not afford due 
process to the student, since the student could not recover when the punishment 
resulted from a reasonable, good faith mistake in the school disciplinary process, 
and particularly since even if the student could sue for good faith error in the 
infliction of punishment, the lawsuit would occur after the imposition of the 
physical pain, which was final and irreparable and could not be undone in a 
subsequent proceeding. (Ingraham v. Wright, 1977 P. 1425)”
Case
Board of Curators. Univ. of MO. v. Horowitz, 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978)
Procedural Setting
U.S. Supreme Court
Facts
Horowitz was a student in her final year of study at the University of Missouri - 
Kansas City Medical School in 1971. In the Spring of Horowitz’s first year of study, 
several faculty members expressed dissatisfaction with her performance, hygiene, and 
attendance. Upon recommendation by the Council o f Evaluation she was advanced to her 
second and final year on a probationary basis. Dissatisfaction amongst the staff 
continued during the second year, and they subsequently decided to deny her graduation
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for June of 1971. Additionally, the Council recommended that, absent “radical
improvement,” Horowitz be dropped from school.
Horowitz was permitted to appeal the decision by taking a set o f oral and practical 
examinations. At the conclusion of the examinations, two physicians recommended that 
she be allowed to graduate, two recommended she be dropped from the school, and three 
recommended that she should not be allowed to graduate and remain on probationary 
status, pending further reports on her clinical progress. The Council on Evaluation met in 
May, 1971 to consider whether Horowitz be allowed to remain in school beyond June of 
that year. The Council unanimously reaffirmed its recommendation and dropped 
Horowitz from the school. Suit was filed in the Eighth Circuit District Court, which 
subsequently sided in favor of the School, however, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the decision and found in favor o f Horowitz. The school then brought a third 
and final court action to the United States Supreme Court.
Holding
The United States Supreme Court held that Horowitz was afforded full procedural 
due process and thereby sided with the school of medicine.
Rationale of Holding 
The Supreme Court ruled in agreement with the District Court that Horowitz;
“was afforded full procedural due process by the [School]. In fact, the Court is of 
the opinion, and so finds, that the school went beyond [constitutionally required] 
procedural due process by affording [respondent] the opportunity to be examined 
by seven independent physicians in order to be absolutely certain that their 
grading of the [respondent] in her medical skills was correct. (Board of Curators. 
Univ. of MO. V. Horowitz. 1978 P. 952)”
Furthermore, the Court held in accordance with Goss that due process requires, in
connection with the suspension o f a student for disciplinary reasons; notice, opportunity
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to respond, and an appeal process. Additionally, the Court found that the decision to
dismiss, Horowitz, was careful and deliberate.
According to the Court, disciplinary cases have;
“no application...Misconduct is a very different matter from failure to attain a 
standard of excellence in studies. A determination as to the fact involves 
investigation o f a quite different kind. A public hearing may be regarded as 
helpful to the ascertainment of misconduct and useless or harmful in finding out 
the truth as to scholarship. (Board of Curators. Univ. of MO. v. Horowitz, 1978 
P. 953)"
Furthermore, the Court, with respect to procedural due process, warned against any such
judicial intrusion into academic decision making, by declaring the following;
“Academic evaluations of a student, in contrast to disciplinary determinations, 
bear little resemblance to the judicial and administrative fact finding proceedings 
to which we have traditionally attached a full-hearing requirement. In Goss, the 
school's decision to suspend the students rested on factual conclusions that the 
individual students had participated in demonstrations that had disrupted classes, 
attacked a police officer, or caused physical damage to school property. The 
requirement of a hearing, where the student could present his side o f the factual 
issue, could under such circumstances "provide a meaningful hedge against 
erroneous action." Ibid. The decision to dismiss respondent, by comparison, 
rested on the academic judgment o f school officials that she did not have the 
necessary clinical ability to perform adequately as a medical doctor and was 
making insufficient progress toward that goal. Such a judgment is by its nature 
more subjective and evaluative than the typical factual questions presented in the 
average disciplinary decision. Like the decision of an individual professor as to 
the proper grade for a student in his course, the determination whether to dismiss 
a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation o f cumulative 
information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or 
administrative decision making.
Under such circumstances, we decline to ignore the historic judgment of 
educators and thereby formalize the academic dismissal process by requiring a 
hearing. The educational process is not by nature adversary; instead it centers on a 
continuing relationship between faculty and students, "one in which the teacher 
must occupy many roles - educator, adviser, friend, and, at times, parent- 
substitute (Goss v. Lopez. 1975).” This is especially true as one advances through 
the varying regimes of the educational system, and the instruction becomes both 
more individualized and more specialized. In Goss, this Court concluded that the 
value o f some form of hearing in a disciplinary context outweighs any resulting 
harm to the academic environment. Influencing this conclusion was clearly the 
belief that disciplinary proceedings, in which the teacher must decide whether to 
punish a student for disruptive or insubordinate behavior, may automatically bring
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an adversary flavor to the normal student-teacher relationship. The same 
conclusion does not follow in the academic context. We decline to further enlarge 
the judicial presence in the academic community and thereby risk deterioration of 
many beneficial aspects of the faculty-student relationship. (Board of Curators. 
Univ. of MO. V. Horowitz. 1978 Pp. 953 - 954)”
Dissent/Concurring Opinions
Judge Justice Marshall concurred and dissented in the judgment and expressed the 
following view;
“I agree with the Court that, "assuming the existence o f a liberty or property 
interest, respondent has been awarded at least as much due process as the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires." Ante, at 84-85.1 cannot join the Court's 
opinion, however, because it contains dictum suggesting that respondent was 
entitled to even less procedural protection than she received. I also differ from the 
Court in its assumption that characterization of the reasons for a dismissal as 
"academic" or "disciplinary" is relevant to resolution of the question of what 
procedures are required by the Due Process Clause. Finally, I disagree with the 
Court's decision not to remand to the Court of Appeals for consideration of 
respondent's substantive due process claim. (Board o f Curators. Univ. of MO. v. 
Horowitz, 1978, P. 958)”
Case
Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986)
Procedural Setting
U.S. Supreme Court
Facts
A high school student delivered a speech, nominating one of his friends for a 
student council office, at an assembly. The speech included numerous references to the 
candidate in terms of sexual metaphors. After Fraser made statements like, “he’s firm in 
his pants... his character is firm,” “a man who takes his point and pounds it in,” and “a 
man who will go to the very end -even the climax, for each and every one o f you,” the 
students at the assembly began to make sexually suggestive gestures while others
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appeared to be bewildered and embarrassed. Furthermore, some of the students 
continued to be disruptive many days after the incident. Additionally, before Fraser 
made the speech, he discussed it with at least two o f his teachers, who informed him that 
the speech was “inappropriate” and that if  given he might have to endure “severe 
consequences.” The day after the speech, Fraser was placed on a three-day suspension. 
He served two o f the three-days and was readmitted on the morning of the third day. 
Bethel brought an action suit in the District Court for the Western district of Washington.
Holding
The United States Supreme Court held that Fraser’s free speech and due process 
rights had not been violated when Bethel School District suspended him for two days 
after he made sexually suggestive comments during a speech at a school assembly.
Rationale of Holding 
The District Court awarded Fraser damages and allowed him to speak at 
graduation. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the order claiming 
that there was no merit to the claim that the suspension violated due process on the 
ground that Fraser had no way of knowing that the delivery o f the speech would subject 
him to disciplinary sanctions. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a two-day suspension 
does not call for full panoply o f procedural due process protections applicable to a 
criminal prosecution. The Court also recognized that because the school had a prior 
disciplinary rule in effect and that because of the prior admonitions o f at least two 
teachers, Fraser was given adequate warning that his speech could subject him to 
sanctions when at least two of his teachers warned of the consequences if he chose to 
give his speech as written. Additionally, the Court found no merit to the claim that the
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suspension violated due process due to the fact that Fraser had adequate notice and
opportunity to tell his side of the story and still chose to give a speech that contained
graphic and explicit sexual metaphors. The Court cited Goss v. Lopez by stating;
“Two days' suspension from school does not rise to the level of a penal sanction 
calling for the full panoply of procedural due process protections applicable to a 
criminal prosecution. The school disciplinary rule proscribing "obscene" 
language and the pre-speech admonitions of teachers gave adequate warning to 
Fraser that his lewd speech could subject him to sanctions. (Bethel School Dist. v. 
Fraser. 1986 P. 3163)”
Finally, it has been noted that the ruling in Bethel further affirmed the ruling of Goss.
Specifically, the Bethel decision was based on the facts that all due process protections
outlined in Goss were adhered to.
Dissent/Concurring Opinions
Judge J. Brennan concurred in the judgment and expressed the following view:
“(1) It was not unconstitutional for school officials to conclude under the 
circumstances that the student’s remarks exceeded permissible limits, and (2) the 
officials did not exceed the bounds of their disciplinary authority, but (3) the 
language o f speech was not obscene, and (4) school officials thus could not 
punish the speech out of a need to protect younger students.” (Bethel School Dist. 
V. Fraser, 1986, P. 3165)
Judge J. Marshall dissented by expressing the view that;
“The Court of Appeals’ judgment should not have been disturbed, because the 
school district had failed to bring in evidence sufficient to convince either the 
District Court or the Court of Appeals that education was disrupted at the school 
by the student’s speech.” (Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 1986, P. 3166)
Finally, Judge J. Stevens dissented by stating,
“(1) Neither the school’s disciplinary rule nor the teachers’ warnings gave the 
student fair notice that he would be punished for delivering his speech, and (2) the 
speech’s impropriety was not so obvious that no specific notice was required.” 
(Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 1986, P. 3168)
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Summary
Wood, Horowitz, Ingraham, and Bethel comprised the only four federal cases 
heard by the Supreme Court dealing with procedural and substantive due process, within 
the parameters of this study, since Goss. All four cases reaffirmed the prior ruling, set 
forth in Goss v. Lopez. However, in the case o f Ingraham, which the disciplinary action 
taken by the school was in the form of corporal punishment, the Court held that Goss was 
intended to be utilized as a guideline for loss o f life, liberty, and property violations, of 
which corporal punishment did not apply. More specifically, Ingraham did not find 
infringement of a property interest in administration of corporal punishment. Therefore, 
while Ingraham affirmed Goss, it also redefined the landmark case by limiting i f  s 
applicability to only short-term suspensions as a loss of constitutionally protected 
property interest in the form of removal from school or termination of educational 
services.
Furthermore, in the case of Horowitz, it should be noted that although this case 
deals with higher education, it was evident to this author that it’s relevancy to this work 
outweighed the sifting process noted in Chapter Three. The Horowitz Court ruled that 
academic discipline does not fall under the protection of Goss, because administrative 
decisions based on incompetence do not constitute disciplinary action or loss of property 
interest based on disciplinary action.
Case Law (E ‘ Circuit)
Case
Bauza v. Morales Carrion, 578 F.2d 447, (1st Cir., 1978)
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Procedural Setting
E* Circuit -  Court o f Appeals
Facts
Claudio Bauza was one of 102 applicants in March of 1976 trying to vie for 25 
positions in the upcoming kindergarten class of the Elementary School of the University 
o f Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras Campus. Admission to kindergarten of the elementary 
school opens up an opportunity to stay at the school through its various levels that 
ultimately includes high school. The parents of Bauza alleged that the school had 
preferred some children rather than selecting by lot from among all qualified applicants. 
Bauza’s family indicated that five of the vacancies were filled with students who had not 
achieved progress the previous year and were retained, thereby only creating twenty 
vacancies for the 1976 -  1977 school year. Bauza and 76 other students survived the 
initial testing and interview procedure. Twenty of those students were subsequently 
selected of which Bauza was not one of them.
In May of 1976, a waiting list was derived and each of the students on the list was 
separated into three categories by I.Q. The categories were labeled excellent, good and 
average, of which Bauza was not placed on the “excellent” list. By mid August, eight 
spaces had opened and seven students were selected. The director testified that she chose 
those students whose parents had re-expressed interest after their initial rejeetion. An 
eighth student was seleeted from the “good” list solely on the basis of being the child of a 
new teacher at the sehool, whieh is a preference specified in the school regulation and 
approved by the District Court. It was also revealed that the initial seven students were 
children of professors at the University of Puerto Rico. The regulation read, “There will
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be no waiting list neither o f Level 1 nor for any other level while the registration per 
group is not reduced to the agreed norm.” Bauza failed to be admitted to the school and 
her parents brought suit against the school.
Holding
The Court granted judgment as a matter o f law for the school, since there was no 
violation of procedural due process.
Rationale o f Holding
The Court found that the practice o f waiting list selection, although carried on in
the past, had been abolished since 1973. The Court ruled that the defendants had adopted
and implemented a discriminatory system of admission to the school and therefore
violated rights to the equal protection laws, in which Brown v. Board of Education and
Goss V. Lopez were cited. The court also found that Bauza had met all eligibility
requirements, and was, “Entitled to be considered in the lottery for entrance along with
many other qualified applicants.” Furthermore, the Court stated;
“Plaintiffs' claim does not rest on any contention that their child was being denied 
a free public education generally. Other schools are available. Indeed, plaintiffs 
claim no absolute right for their child to attend the University School — their 
claim boils down to a claim of right to participate in a lottery for the limited 
number of available places. Nor is this a case where having been admitted to a 
particular school, plaintiffs' child was suspended or dismissed without being 
afforded adequate process. (Bauza v. Morales Carrion. 1978 P. 452)”
The Court held that because the Plaintiff was not denied a liberty or property
interest without adequate process, and the fact that other schools were available to the
plaintiff, Bauza had no absolute right to attend the University School. Therefore, the
Court found that any claims o f due process violations were moot. Therefore, although
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Goss was cited, Bauza just as Ingraham found that in order for Goss to be applicable a 
denial of school attendance must have oceurred.
Case
Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995, (1®‘ Cir., 1982)
Procedural Setting
Circuit - U.S. District Court
Facts
On December 11, 1979, while attending public school at Mattanawcook 
Academy, Daniel Boynton was questioned by the school principal and vice-principal 
concerning his use of marijuana on school premises. During the questioning, Boynton 
admitted using marijuana on school property and was immediately suspended from 
school.
The disputes stemmed from four alleged violations. The first count was due to 
Boynton being questioned without his parents being present and subsequently admitting 
to possessing and using marijuana on school property. Boynton’s second count claimed 
that although he attended various “substance abuse” programs the school board expelled 
him from school without identifying the reason. The third count in question was because, 
Boynton alleged that the disciplinary committee’s actions were “arbitrary, improper and 
an abuse of the discretion given to the school officials.” Boynton argued, (count three) 
that he was not given notice or opportunity to be heard and, (count four), that he was 
placed on school probation, were in violation of his due process rights. Finally, Daniel 
Boynton brought suit, alleging that the principal and vice-principal denied him due 
process of the law.
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Holding
The complaints were dismissed for failure to state a federal eonstitutional claim 
upon which relief could be granted.
Rationale of Holding
The Court found that with regard to the first count, Boynton was granted due 
process rights through the questioning that took place at the school. Furthermore, the 
Court found no authority sustaining any constitutional right to have Boynton’s parents 
present during questioning. Boynton’s allegation that he was not read his rights was not 
applicable in the school setting. The second count of the complaint, failure to assign 
reasons for the expulsion, cited Wood v. Strickland, where the Eighth Circuit held that 
the evidence produced at the school board disciplinary hearing was insufficient.
However, the Court found that the necessary evidence was produced and thereby sided 
with the school. With regard to the third count, the Court ruled that Boynton was given 
ample opportunity to be heard during the initial questioning that took place at the school. 
The Court went on to hold that the expulsion of a student for the remainder o f the school 
year for smoking marijuana in school was not unconstitutional. Although the plaintiff 
seemed to suggest that his participation in substance-abuse programs satisfactorily 
evidenced his repentance that entitled him to immediate reinstatement into school.
The Court held that participation in the courses did not render the boards action as 
arbitrary. Finally, with regard to count four, placing Boynton on “school probation,” the 
court ruled that the action taken did not amount to deprivation o f any constitutionally 
protected property or liberty interest, thereby adhering to Goss. Therefore, because the 
case at hand did not constitute violation of due process law because there was no loss of
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protected interests, the Court found that the fundamental jurisprudence of Goss was 
followed.
Case
Donovan v. Ritchie. 68 F.3d 14, (Mass. 1995)
Procedural Setting
D* Circuit - Court o f Appeals
Facts
On September 18, 1994, approximately fifteen students gathered in a student’s 
home and created “The Shit List.” “The Shit List” contained general remarks of 
“boorish” nature and also zeroed in on 140 named students. One or more lines of crude 
descriptions of character and/or behavior followed each name. The descriptions included 
insulting comments about appearance or social conduct, epithets that were suggestive of 
sexual capacity, proclivity, and promiscuity. Donovan and two other boys made copies 
of the list, put them in a trash barrel, and then delivered it to the school shortly after. Mr. 
Ritchie, prineipal, began an investigation soon after a faculty member discovered the 
documents. On Monday, September 26, 1994, two days later, Donovan and two others 
were summoned to Mr. Ritchie’s office and subsequently denied any involvement. The 
next day the students returned and confessed that they had photocopied the material. 
Furthermore, the students stated that because the copying had been done off school 
property they were not subject to school discipline. On Thursday, September 29, 1994, a 
letter was sent to the fifteen students requesting a meeting with them and their parents.
During that meeting, Mr. Ritchie informed the students that they were in violation 
o f the school’s rules, regarding school disruption, and suspended the students
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indefinitely. He also informed the students that information would be forthcoming and
that each student was to write an apology letter. On September 30, 1994, Donovan issued
his letter, which apologized for his “bad mistake.” Two days later, Mr. Ritchie wrote
Donovan’s mother and issued a ten-day suspension as well as exclusion from any school
social events and interscholastic athletics. Appeals to the superintendent and later to the
school committee were unsuecessful. Donovan brought suit under both state and federal
statutes and constitutional provisions after he was suspended for ten days from school
and excluded from various extracurricular activities. During a five-day bench trial the
argument focused on whether Donovan had been afforded procedural due process. The
District Court applied the jurisprudence in Goss v. Lopez by stating;
“We are, therefore, dealing with the kind of temporary suspension at issue in Goss 
V. Lopez. In that ease the Court succinetly summarized the three procedural 
prerequisites: "that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges 
against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities 
have and an opportunity to present his side of the story." The Court added, "In 
the great majority of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged 
misconduct with the student minutes after it has oceurred." In order for the 
student "to explain his version of the facts at this discussion, [he should] first be 
told what he is accused of doing and what the basis o f the accusation is." 
"Requiring that there be at least an informal give-and-take between student and 
disciplinarian," the Court concluded, would at least give the student "the 
opportunity to characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper 
context. (Donovan v. Ritchie. 1995 P. 17)”
Holding
The Court granted judgment as a matter of law for the school since notice and 
opportunity to be heard was granted.
Rationale of Holding 
The Appeals Court declared that Donovan had clearly been given adequate notice 
and he had ample opportunity to present his version of the facts. Finally, the District
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Court granted judgment as a matter o f law for the school and found the process given
Donovan was adequate. Specifically, Donovan was allowed to give his side of the story
on September 26, 27, and 30, 1994. Furthermore, he was issued notice of his suspension
and the facts surrounding the decision in written and oral form on September 29, 1994.
Donovan filed an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The
Court of Appeals reaffirmed Goss by stating;
”We conclude from the record that appellant had, and took advantage of, multiple 
opportunities to present his view o f what occurred. On September 26, he and two 
others met with Principal Ritchie and denied any involvement. On September 27, 
they had another meeting and admitted photocopying, but no knowledge of 
contents. They also advanced their defense that their act did not take place on 
school property. On September 30, appellant and his mother met separately with 
Principal Ritchie, after a larger meeting, and had the opportunity to add to what 
had been said. (Donovan v. Ritchie, 1995 P. 18)”
Case
Zehner v. Central Berkshire Regional Sch. Dist.. 921 F. Supp. 850, (D. Mass. 1996)
Procedural Setting
U‘ Circuit - U.S. District Court
Facts
On October 15, 1993, Zehner, a senior at Wahconah Regional High School in 
Dalton, Massachusetts, was leaving the school parking lot at the conclusion of the school 
day. Zehner drove his truck at a very slow rate, thus hampering the flow of traffic. The 
defendants provided the school handbook that stated that student driven cars must not 
interfere with the school buses and infractions of motor vehicle rules would result in the 
loss of the privilege of bringing a car to school. Zehner informed Mr. Farley, Assistant 
Principal, that his parents were out of town and parental contact advising of the loss of 
privileges was not conveyed to Zehner’s parents until later in the week.
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Zehner attended a school dance with his girlfriend on October 29, 1993. 
According to school officials, Zehner attended the dance, “exhibiting impaired speech, a 
strong odor o f alcohol and an unsteady gait.” Farley and Mr. Potter, Principal, 
questioned Zehner about his condition and Zehner denied using alcohol prior to attending 
the dance. Potter charged Zehner with the use of alcohol and gave him the opportunity to 
respond. Officer McGinnis then took Zehner's car keys away from him. Zehner was 
directed to report to the principal’s office the following Monday, and no attempt was 
made to contact his parents.
On November 1, 1993, Zehner was met by his soccer coach and informed that he 
was off the team for the rest o f the season. Zehner then called his mother asking her to 
come to his school. At approximately 8:00 a.m. Mrs. Zehner met with Farley and Potter 
concerning the incident at the dance. During that conference, Zehner and his mother 
were informed of the charges and told that Zehner would not only be excluded from the 
soccer team but would also have to serve a three-day suspension from school. Zehner in 
the presence o f his mother called Potter a “fucking prick” and then left the office. Mrs. 
Zehner was advised of her right to appeal to the superintendent. Documentation of the 
suspension was provided to Mr. and Mrs. Zehner.
The third and final disciplinary action, a three day suspension, occurred on 
November 10, 1993, when Zehner was questioned by a teacher as to why he skipped his 
study hall class. Zehner immediately became hostile and threatened the teacher by 
saying, “That’s it buddy, I am going to get you! I am going to sue you!” Farley 
ultimately called the police at which point Zehner turned his anger towards him by 
saying, “You think you are so tough, why don’t you take off your badge.”
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Subsequently, William Zehner Jr. alleged that he wrongfully received two three- 
day suspensions from school, was excluded from the soccer team for the remainder of the 
season, and not allowed to park his truck in the school lot.
Holding
Zehner’s motion for summary judgment was denied and the cross motion for summary 
judgment by the school was allowed since Zehner was granted full procedural due 
process.
Rationale o f Holding 
The District Court found that Zehner was given both oral and written notice and 
an opportunity to present his side of the story consistent with Goss. Furthermore the 
Court ruled that while the suspensions clearly fell under due process safeguard due to 
property/liberty interests, it found that loss of parking privileges and removal from the 
soccer team did not. Therefore, removal from extracurricular activities and loss of 
privileges are not protected under constitutional law. Finally, the District Courts and 
Courts of Appeals have consistently found that if  no determination o f loss of life, 
property, or liberty is made, due process claims are outside the protection of Goss.
Case
Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dep't. 263 F. Supp. 2d 195, (D. Mass. 2003)
Procedural Setting
C  Circuit - U.S. District Court
Facts
On April 5, 2000, Michael Demers was a fifteen year-old eighth grade special 
education student at Northwest School in Leominster, Massachusetts. On that day he was
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dismpting his English class through excessive talking and was reprimanded by his 
teacher. When he continued to be disruptive, Demers was asked to go next door to his 
math teacher’s classroom. The math teacher instructed him to draw a picture showing 
how he felt about being removed from his English class. Michael made a drawing of his 
school surrounded by explosives and students hanging out o f the windows. On the other 
side o f the paper Demers drew the Superintendent of the school with a gun at his head. 
Later that same day, the drawing was delivered to the principal’s office. Two days later, 
Michael was called to the principal’s office and confronted with the drawing. Michael 
stated that it was only an assignment and he was expressing his feelings. Michael was 
suspended until a meeting could be held on April 11, 2000.
Michael was required to meet with the personnel director, who told him that if he 
was “cleared” by a psychiatrist and got “medication,” he could remain in school. A 
“team” meeting took place on April 11, 2000, which included Michael, his father, the 
principal, the personnel director and members o f his special education team. Michael 
was allowed to remain in school on the condition that he received a psychiatric 
evaluation. The record was unclear as to whether Michael ever intended to see a 
psychiatrist after Michael’s dad informed the principal that he was unable to get Michael 
to the psychiatric evaluation. The principal did not allow Michael to return to school due 
to the fact that the stipulated condition had not been met.
On May 1, 2000, a team meeting was held which resulted in the decision that 
Michael should be excluded from school for the remainder of the school year and that 
alternative special services would be provided. The personnel director received a letter 
via the superintendent that requested an immediate appeal of the exclusion. The
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personnel director then informed Michael’s father that there would be no hearing and that 
the school department was required only to provide Michael with an alternative education 
plan. On May 16, 2000, an action was filed in the Court alleging violations o f Michael’s 
state and federal constitutional rights and state law.
Holding
The court held that the school officials did not violate Demers due process rights 
since there was no loss of property interest.
Rationale of Holding
The Court ruled that due process requirements of Goss were met with regard to 
Michael’s initial suspension. Specifically, Demers was presented with the charges 
against him, provided the opportunity to respond, and given various avenues in which to 
appeal. Furthermore the Court cited IDEA, which requires that parents be provided the 
“opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to the 
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the [disabled] child. Further, 
parents with a complaint are entitled to an impartial due process hearing.” Therefore, the 
Court held that Michael had other avenues that had not been exhausted in which to be 
heard. With regard to Goss, Demers was given the opportunity to attend an alternative 
setting and therefore was not removed from school. Thus from a procedural due process 
perspective, Goss did not apply since there was no loss of property interest.
Summary
Five eases relevant to this study from the E' Circuit were briefed. Specifically, 
three from the U.S. District Court and two from the U.S. E‘ Circuit Court of Appeals
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were examined for relevance. Furthermore, of the five cases all were sided in favor o f 
the Defendants.
Case Law (2"^ Circuit)
Case
Ouimette v. Babbie, 405 F. Supp. 525 (D. Vt. 1975)
Procedural Setting
2"'̂  Circuit - U.S. District Court
Facts
Missisquoi Valley Union High School (MVUHS) established physical education 
as a required course of study in which Ouimette refused to attend and participate. 
Subsequently, she was suspended from school. A hearing on November 14, 1975, 
permitted Yvonne to return to classes pending further hearing on the merits that was held 
on November 28, 1975. In the interim, a board hearing was held (which also allowed the 
plaintiffs the opportunity to present reasons for Ouimette’s refusal to attend and 
participate in class) and the board members to continue its policy of requiring all seventh 
grade students to attend classes in physical education and to continue the suspension from 
the school until she attended and participated in physical education class.
At the beginning of the school year, the Ouimette’s were informed that Yvonne 
would have to participate in physical education class and that classes would be conducted 
two hours each week during the school year. It was also stated that the remaining three 
hours a week would be devoted to Language Arts class. However, due to a curtailment in 
funds, the Language Arts class was eliminated and Babbie supplemented the schedule
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with an additional three hours of physical education class. Yvonne attended all of her 
classes with the exception of physical education. The school entertained numerous 
conferences with Yvonne and her parents. Yvonne and her father were adamant that she 
would not attend the elass. Supervised study periods were substituted until the next 
board meeting.
On September 18, 1975, the board of directors of MVUHS gave Yvonne and her 
parents the opportunity to present their objections. The only argument presented was that 
Yvonne “should have every right to do only what she wanted to.” Subsequently, the 
board denied the request and continued to direct Ouimette to attend all of her classes or 
be excluded from school altogether. Plaintiff Kent Ouimette brought suit, on hehalf of 
his daughter Yvonne, against the principal. Babbie, and school directors of the 
Missisquoi Valley Union High School (MVUHS) for excluding her from attending 
school.
Holding
The District Court held that the requirements of Goss had been satisfied and 
subsequently denied the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief by dismissing the case.
Rationale of Holding
The Court found that when the Ouimette’s testified in court the reasons for 
Yvonne not attending class were expanded to not having enough time to get to class 
without being tardy, lack o f individual shower rooms, and disinterest in competitive 
athletics. The defendants offered to accommodate Yvonne by scheduling the physical 
education elass for the last period of the day. Furthermore, since Yvonne was given 
adequate opportunity to present her side of the story and because the Ouimettes were
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notified of the charges against Yvonne, the Court held that Yvonne had been deprived of
the opportunity to attend school. However, they also found that in this particular instance
the deprivation was the product o f the plaintiffs’ choice.
According to Goss, the District Court held that since it was the Ouimette’s choice
to not attend school, there were no substantial grounds that property interest had been
denied. Moreover, the District Court cited Goss by citing the following;
“The essentials of due process are notice that disciplinary action is under 
consideration and an adequate opportunity for the student and her parents to 
present their side of the story. This includes the opportunity to listen to the 
explanation of the school authorities concerning the reasons for any disciplinary 
action that may be contemplated in the situation that confronts them. These 
precautionary measures, absent an emergency situation, should precede removal. 
(Ouimette v. Babbie. 1975 P. 525)”
’’Each of these requirements was fulfilled in Yvonne's temporary suspension, both 
at the initial hearing in September and at the second hearing on November 20, 
when the plaintiffs had the assistance o f counsel. From the record it appears that 
both hearings were essentially fair. The process due the plaintiffs has been 
accorded them within the precepts o f Goss. The court recognizes that the school 
board and the administration, in the action taken, were deciding on the validity of 
policy requirements which were imposed by the defendants. In this civil rights 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, only the constitutional right to Due Process has 
been asserted. Once these requirements have been met, there is no remaining issue 
for decision. (Ouimette v. Babbie. 1975 P. 529)”
Additionally, although minimal due process had been given to the Ouimette’s, in the
case at hand Goss does not apply when deprivation of life, liberty, or property is absent.
Case
Johnpoll V. Elias. 513 F. Supp. 430, (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
Procedural Setting 
2"  ̂Circuit - U.S. District Court / N.Y.
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Facts
Joseph Johnpoll was a tenth grade special education student in September of 
1980. Johnpoll, while in junior high school, was asked to choose the school he would 
like to attend the following year. Johnpoll subsequently choose John Jay High School 
because the two schools he desired to attend were not on the issued list. It also seems 
that Johnpoll was informed that he would likely be assigned to either Murrow or 
Midwood, which were his schools o f choice. Johnpoll brought suit when he learned that 
he was assigned to John Jay.
Johnpoll contended that the district failed to consider his emotional and physical 
handicap and was denied due process. The plaintiffs alleged that compelling Johnpoll to 
attend John Jay High School would make it impossible for him to gain an education by 
stating, “With its rampant crime, violence, drugs and social behavior that is sexually and 
emotionally far more open than Joseph has experienced.”
Holding
The motion for a preliminary injunction was denied since Johnpoll was not denied 
property interests.
Rationale o f Holding
The District Court found that this particular case did not present a situation, which 
the Goss Court sought to protect, due to the fact that Johnpoll had not been denied his 
right to education. Therefore, because Johnpoll was offered an education but refused to 
attend the protections guaranteed by Goss did not apply. Specifically, the District Court 
stated;
“This case does not present a situation which the Goss court sought to protect
since Joseph has not been denied his right to education. He can receive an
78
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
education at John Jay. Merely because Joseph is not being permitted to attend the 
school o f his choice is not tantamount to a denial o f a right to an education. 
(Johnpoll V. Elias. 1980 P. 431)”
Case
Orozco V. Sobol. 703 F. Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
Procedural Setting 
2™" Circuit - U.S. District Court / N.Y
Facts
On September 9, 1987, Sixta L. Orozco tried to enroll in the Mount Vernon public 
schools after professing her desire to find permanent housing in that city. School 
officials informed her and her mother that she could not be enrolled in that school system 
since she did not reside in Mount Vernon. On September 10, 1987, Ms. Arroyo, Orozco’s 
mother attempted to enroll Orozco into the Yonkers school system and was again refused 
enrollment for the same reason.
School opened on September 10, and Ms. Arroyo instituted action contending that 
Orozco was denied her right to a public education in New Y ork without being afforded 
the protections accorded by due process. Furthermore, the State Commissioner of 
Education, who has general supervisory authority over New York’s public school system 
under N.Y. Educ. Law, knew that local school districts had a pattern and practice of 
denying homeless children admission into their schools without any modicum of 
procedural protections.
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Holding
The Court ruled that certain levels o f appeal did exist; therefore a minimal amount 
of due process also existed. Consequently the defendant’s motion to dismiss was granted 
in part.
Rationale of Holding
The Court granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction requiring that Orozco be 
admitted to the Yonkers school district so long as her then-existing living conditions 
continued to occur (living in a shelter in Yonkers). After the ruling two important events 
occurred, first Orozco and her mother moved to Puerto Rico, thus voluntarily 
withdrawing from the Yonkers school system, and secondly the New York Board of 
Regents approved new regulations governing the placement of homeless children in New 
York’s educational system. The second change mandated that any decision denying a 
child from attending school must be preceded by a hearing and accompanied by notice 
outlining the bases of the decision and avenues of appeal.
The court quoted Honig v. Doe by citing the mootness doctrine. The fact that the 
plaintiff had returned to Puerto Rico suggested that she no longer retained a “personal 
stake” in the outcome of the litigation, and thereby rendered her claims moot. The Court 
ruled that if  local school districts had a practice of summarily denying education to 
students already enrolled in their school would certainly violate due process rights. 
However, a student who has not enrolled does not necessarily have a cognizable property 
interest in public education. In this particular case Orozco was sheltered at the time in 
question in Yonkers, and her mother desired to live in Mount Vernon. However, given 
her economic situation, she had little control of where she could afford to live and there
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was no need for a hearing to resolve factual disputes since all pertinent information was
fairly known. Therefore, although Goss would have applied because Orozco was
previously enrolled in Yonkers and because Orozco was living in a shelter located in the
attendance zone of Yonkers, since Orozco and her family moved to Puerto Rico, her due
process rights were no longer applicable.
“If local school districts had a practice of summarily denying continued education 
to students already enrolled in their schools, then we have little doubt that this 
would constitute a violation o f due process and noting that when a child is already 
within a school district's control and is subsequently denied continued admission 
without notice and hearing, such conduct violates due process. That is not the 
situation before us, however. We are presented with a homeless child — who was 
not then enrolled in a New York school and whose residency for school purposes 
is a matter o f great dispute — who was seeking and was summarily denied 
admission. (Orozco v. Sobok 1989 P. 1118- 1119)”
’’Indeed, although this case is framed within the context of procedural due 
process, the issue is more one of placement than it is of process — i.e., defining 
how a timely and fair determination of plaintiffs residence can be made so as to 
allow her placement in the proper public school. To be sure, this question 
embraces certain Fourteenth Amendment concerns. Whatever means are chosen, 
they must comport with the root requirements of due process (notice and hearing) 
since plaintiff has a constitutionally cognizable property interest in a New York 
public education. It does not necessarily follow, however, as plaintiff contends, 
that due process requires the local school districts to provide the hearing on 
residency matters. (Orozco v. Sobok 1989 P. 1118- 1119)”
Case
F.N. bv & Through D.N. v. Board o f Education of Sachem Central School District. 894 
F. Supp. 605, (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
Procedural Setting 
2"" Circuit - U.S. District Court / N.Y.
Facts
F.N., a tenth grade student at Sachem High School South, was a special education 
student whose history o f academic, social, and emotional difficulties dated back to his
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kindergarten year. Although there had never been any documented misconduct at school 
prior to January 5, 1995, F.N. was suspended for five-days for inappropriate sexual 
behavior directed at his Spanish teacher.
On January 5, 1995, F.N.’s Spanish teacher reported that while she was alone in 
the classroom with F.N., he began to masturbate, followed her around the room, and 
refused to either stop or leave the room as directed. F.N.’s parents alleged that they were 
not advised by the school district at the January 10, 1995, meeting o f their son’s rights 
under IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, or N.Y. Educ Law Article 89, which identifies rights 
of children with handicaps. The school alleged that they had informed the parents and 
gave them a packet entitled “Parental Due Process Rights.” The plaintiffs deny that they 
received any information.
During the hearing conducted by the superintendent on January 10, 1995, it 
appeared that the defendants agreed that F.N. would be referred for evaluations and 
receive home instruction pending completion o f  the evaluations. F.N .’s parents requested 
an impartial hearing to review the determination o f the suspension. The plaintiffs refused 
to attend the hearing and instead threatened to bring suit if their son was not allowed to 
return to school. On April 25, 1995, one of the initial psychologists reevaluated his 
earlier findings, which recommended that F.N. be returned to the regular classroom and 
that he was suffering an adverse impact from his continued exclusion from school. 
Subsequently, F.N. was denied his motion for a temporary restraining order and 
preliminary injunction after he brought suit against the Board of Education of Sachem 
Central School District at Holbrook.
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Holding
The plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary 
injunction with regard to the claim that the defendants have deprived F.N. o f a publie 
education, to which he is entitled by N.Y Edue. La in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, was denied.
Rationale of Holding
The Court found that the sehool-direeted evaluations took place and resulted in a 
determination that F.N. was not handicapped. Furthermore, the Court found that it was 
evident that the home instruction was not conducted in a regular or reliable manner. With 
this in mind the Court held that the school had satisfied due process procedures set forth 
by both state and federal law. Additionally, while the Court was concerned with the 
lengthy period in which F.N.’s education was interrupted, it also found that the plaintiffs 
failed to show that the school district had violated any prescribed procedure with regard 
to notice and hearing. Finally, the Court ruled that since F.N. was not only allowed but 
also directed to attend school F.N. was not denied an education according to Goss.
Case
Mazevski v. Horseheads Cent. Sch. Dist., 950 F. Supp. 69, (W.D.N.Y. 1997)
Procedural Setting 
Circuit - U.S. District Court / N.Y.
Facts
During the 1994 -  95 School year George Mazevski was a junior at Horseheads 
High School and a member of the marching band. Mazevski alleged that he had three 
musical performances scheduled of which two were associated with the school.
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Mazevski stated that Carichner had informed him that he could miss one of two events 
but not both. Cariehner contended that he gave Mazevski permission to miss the first 
event scheduled on October 15, but not the one set for October 22, 1994.
Mazevski attended the performance on the 15* and subsequently missed the 22"‘* 
performance. The next Monday when Mazevski attended school, his counselor informed 
him that he was no longer part of the marching band because he missed the performance 
on October 22. Furthermore, due to his dismissal from the band he was no longer eligible 
to participate in the All State Band.
Mazevski’s parents met with Principal Kent and were informed that the 
circumstances would be reviewed. Kent talked to all of the school’s music teachers and it 
was decided that the dismissal would stand. The court ruled in favor of the defendants by 
granting summary judgment, arguing that participation in a high school marching band 
does not constitute a constitutionally protected property interest, entitling Mazevski to 
procedural due process.
Mazevski’s parents opposed the motion for summary judgment by claiming that 
their son’s participation in the band was constitutionally protected because it was a 
curricular activity that Mazevski received academic credit and because he had to pay $75 
to participate. Therefore, the issue in this case is whether Mazevski was denied a specific 
constitutional guarantee.
Holding
The defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted and the plaintiffs’ 
complaint was dismissed for lack of property interest.
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Rationale of Holding
The Court found that before one is entitled to due process, a property interest
must be established. Dangler v. Yorktown Cent. Seh. Therefore, the issue was whether
Mazevski’s participation in the marching band rises to the level of a property interest.
Goss V. Lopez spoke in terms o f the total “educational process,” and not the right to
participate in each individual component o f that process. The Court Cited Dallam v.
Cumberland Valiev Sch. Dist. According to the Dallam court:
“The property interest in education created by the state is participation in the 
entire process. The myriad activities which combine to form that educational 
process cannot be dissected to create hundreds of separate property rights, each 
cognizable under the Constitution. Otherwise, removal from  a particular class, 
dismissal from an athletic team, a club or any extracurricular activity, would each 
require ultimate satisfaction of procedural due process. (Mazevski v. Horseheads 
Cent. Sch. Dist.. 1997 P. 72)”
Accordingly, the court reaffirmed Goss and Dallam by ruling that only exclusion from
the entire educational process requires implementation of due process rights stipulated by
Goss.
Summary
Five cases relevant to this study from the 2"  ̂Circuit were briefed. Specifically, 
all five from the U.S. District Court were examined for relevance. Furthermore, of the 
five cases all were sided in favor of the Defendants.
Case Law (3"  ̂Circuit)
Case
Dallam v. Cumberland Valiev School Dist.. 391 F. Supp. 358, (M.D. Pa. 1975)
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Procedural Setting
3* Circuit - U.S. District Court / M.D.
Facts
George Dallam, a fifteen-year old plaintiff, transferred to Cumberland Valley 
School District from the neighboring Camp Hill School District. Cumberland Valley is a 
member o f the Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association (P.I.A.A.). The 
Association’s function is to develop and enforce uniform rules governing interscholastic 
athletic competition among member schools. Dallam brought suit against Cumberland 
Valley School District, in the Third Circuit District Court, due to a rule of the P.I.A.A. 
which, automatically bars a student from participation from interscholastic high school 
athletic competition for one school year if a student transfers from one school district to 
another, but does not reside in the transferee district with a parent or guardian.
The underlying objective o f the rule is to prohibit athletically motivated transfers 
and high school athletic recruiting. The plaintiff argued that the automatic ineligibility 
rule acts as an irrefutable presumption in violation of his equal protection and due process 
rights. The defendants concede that no hearing procedure is provided in which a student 
could establish that he transferred for wholly non-athletic reasons, but following his 
transfer, desired to participate in interseholastic athletics.
Holding
The District Court found itself without subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the 
motion to dismiss was granted.
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Rationale of Holding
The Court held that the plaintiff mispereeived the issue. It is irrelevant whether 
the plaintiffs participation in interscholastic athletics is either a right or privilege. At 
no time did the plaintiff point to any act of Congress, which might serve as the basis for a 
right or privilege. Instead, the plaintiff based his argument solely on the 14* Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. Goss speaks in two ways. First, the Court speaks o f 
the serious damage to the plaintiffs reputation because misconduct was allegedly the 
basis for the suspension. Second, the Court looks at the nature of the interest and not its 
weight.
The plaintiff was not seeking instruction, or even participation in a particular area 
of athletics. The record showed that the plaintiff had both instruction and athletic 
competition available to him. The only avenue of athletics temporarily closed was the 
opportunity to compete as a member o f a high school team against other high school 
teams. The Court decided that there existed no constitutionally protected property 
interest in competing for a place on a high school athletic team. Therefore, Goss which 
protects the entire educational process had been complied with.
Case
Everett v. Marease, 426 F. Supp. 397, (E.D. Pa. 1977)
Procedural Setting
3"̂  Circuit - U.S. District Court
Facts
Everett, a student in the School District of Philadelphia was transferred from his 
school to another after being referred to the Principal’s Office numerous times for
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misconduct. Donna Everett brought suit against Michael Marease, Superintendent of the 
School District of Philadelphia, in the Third Circuit of the United States District Court, 
citing that transferring students to behavioral school as a result o f misconduct violated 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. The School District of Philadelphia mandated that a pupil 
may not be suspended from school in excess o f five days unless precise “due process” 
procedures are applied. The District entered a consent decree that approved extensive 
procedures applicable to involuntary transfers of pupils from a non-disciplinary public 
school to a special disciplinary public school maintained by the School District. In the 
past the District had conducted such transfers on an informal and largely ad hoc basis, 
without precise internal guidelines.
The elass action was filed primarily to compel the School District to employ more 
detailed and precise procedures for such transfers. The District throughout the litigation 
took the legal position that the transfers require no due process procedural protections 
because the transfer deprives a pupil of no constitutionally cognizable property right and 
does not amount to punishment. The district agreed that certain procedures could be 
incorporated into a consent decree, which would be applied to all future involuntary 
disciplinary transfers to non-diseiplinary school. Unfortunately, the parties could not 
reach agreement as to certain issues that remained unsolved. They were: the right of the 
pupil to be represented by legal counsel, designation of the hearing officer or tribunal and 
place o f hearing, right of appeal from final decision to transfer, and the right of pupils to 
continue attending school pending final decision on the transfer.
Holding
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The Court ruled in part for both parties. With regard to legal counsel, the 
designation o f the hearing offieer and / or hearing tribunal and place of hearing, and the 
right to appeal a final decision to transfer the Court ruled in favor of the defendants. 
However, the court felt that a transfer prior to final hearing, where there exists no 
emergency situation, would appear to violate the due process prescribed.
Rationale of Holding 
The Court ruled that a transfer from one school to another within the same school 
district does not reduce the educational opportunities of the transferred pupil. School 
districts may assign pupils among its various schools as it deems appropriate and may, 
for purely administrative purposes, assign pupils from one school to another. There is no 
inherent right of the pupil to attend the school of his or her choice, or the choice of the 
parents, within the school district. However, an administrative transfer is vastly different 
from a disciplinary transfer. The terminology o f “disciplinary” transfer suggests 
punishment. Goss stated any disruption in primary or secondary education, whether by 
suspension or involuntary transfer, is a loss of education benefits and opportunities.
The first unresolved issue is the right of a pupil to be represented by legal counsel. 
The Court found that there is no practical advantage to the pupil having the right to be 
represented by an attorney at any informal hearing with the principal. The Court 
continued by stating that there should be no prohibition against a principal permitting, in 
his discretion, the attendance and advice of counsel at such informal hearing. The Court 
cited Dunmore v. Costanzo and Jones v. Gillespie that no specific mention is made as to 
the right to counsel. In practice, attorneys may be permitted to represent pupils and 
parents, but law does not mandate such requirement.
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The next unresolved area was the designation of the hearing officer and / or 
hearing tribunal and place o f hearing. The plaintiffs contend that if  the superintendent’s 
office has the authority to choose the hearing officer, that person may be inclined to 
“rubber stamp” the principal’s original decision of disciplinary transfer. The Court 
reaffirmed that the informal process in place throughout the country does not prohibit a 
superior of the principal as the designated hearing officer. The Court concluded as to the 
hearing officer, that it shall remain the responsibility of the School District to designate a 
fair and impartial person or group of persons to conduct the hearing and make a 
determination. Furthermore, it is not for the federal courts to dictate the internal affairs 
of local governmental agencies.
Concerning the unresolved question of any right to appeal a final decision to 
transfer, the Court affirmed that to provide a third-step hearing or right to appeal would 
not appear to be a requirement o f due process. This, of course, does not preclude any 
party involved from calling upon any appropriate court of competent jurisdiction to 
decide issues it may properly determine.
The final issue is the right o f the pupil to continue attending the school from 
which he or she is proposed to be transferred pending final determination. The Court felt 
that a transfer prior to final hearing, where there exists no emergency situation, would 
appear to violate the due process prescribed. Therefore, with regard to Goss the Court 
determined that students are to be given due process protection if the student is 
transferred from one school to another for disciplinary reasons, but is not required for 
non-disciplinary transfers.
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Case
Davis V. Central Dauphin School Dist. School Board. 466 F. Supp. 1259 (M.D. Pa. 1979)
Procedural Setting
3"̂  ̂Circuit - U.S. District Court / M.D.
Facts
Davis was a member o f the senior class and a member o f the Varsity Basketball 
team of Central Dauphin East High School. On January 30, 1979, Davis played in a 
basketball game that was hotly contested and subsequently had a dispute in the locker 
room with a fellow teammate. The dispute resulted in Davis striking Gregg Ludlam on 
the jaw, which caused a compound fracture and hospitalization of the victim.
On January 31, 1979, Dio K. Chamberlin, principal, held a conference and 
advised Davis that he would be suspended from school attendance for a period of one to 
three days. Davis was given ample opportunity to present his version of the incident.
The principal decided to impose an indefinite suspension from the basketball team 
because of Davis’s conduct, which was unbecoming of an athlete as pursuant to the 
Athletic Association Policy of the Central Dauphin School District adopted in August, 
1975. The policy stated if a student’s “conduct unbecoming an athlete as determined by 
the coach and principal shall become ineligible in all sports for a period of 12 calendar 
months from the day of dismissal.”
On February 1, 1979, a conference was held with Davis, his mother, and Ellis Van 
Orman, Superintendent of Central Dauphin School District in Mr. Van Orman’s office at 
which Davis related his version of the incident. The next day Davis was readmitted to 
school and was suspended from the basketball team for the remainder of the season. Mrs.
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Davis, Russell’s mother, argued that her son was suspended from the basketball team 
without any hearing in violation o f his constitutional rights to due process o f law. Davis 
further argued that the defendants failed to furnish notice and a hearing. Russell Davis 
brought suit against Central Dauphin School District in the Third Circuit of the District 
Court in 1979, alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights.
Holding
The Court believed that Davis’s argument was without merit and the case was 
dismissed.
Rationale of Holding
The defendants contended that Davis was not deprived of a property interest, 
which is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court 
had the view that Davis had a reasonable expectation under the athletic policies that he 
would be permitted to participate in high school athletics unless he violated the 
provisions o f the athletic polices. At the very least, then, it is arguable that Davis had a 
property interest in participating in high school athletics. After an independent review of 
the statues of the Pennsylvania, the Court was of the view that the superintendent was 
without authority to suspend Davis from the basketball team for the remainder of the 
season. However, the court concluded that a fair reading of the athletic policies 
permitted the coach, with the approval of the principal, to impose a suspension up to 12 
months.
The Court would normally decide if due process rights were infringed upon, 
however, since the court needed not to decide if property interest was created, due 
process was received. Davis was aware of the charges and was given opportunity to
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respond. Therefore, the Court affirmed Goss by citing that no property interest is 
afforded to students on athletic teams.
Case
Jordan v. School Dist.. 615 F.2d 85, (Pa. 1980)
Procedural Setting
S"' Circuit - U.S. District Court
Facts
Although the specific improprieties of Jordan were not detailed in the case, Jordan 
V. School Dist. occurred due to questions concerning the due process rights o f students 
who were temporarily removed and transferred because of behavioral problems in their 
regularly assigned school to another school designed to meet the needs of such students. 
Suit was filed by Jordan, in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 1975, for incidents that 
occurred in 1973. The question before the Court was whether the principles o f Goss v. 
Lopez required any modification of the decree, as originally drafted.
Flolding
The Court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the suit in its entirety 
since the Plaintiff was removed from school after receiving adequate procedural due 
process.
Rationale of Holding 
The Court concluded that students faced with suspension from a public school 
have property and liberty interest that qualify for protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The court held that, “the student (must) be given oral or written notice of 
the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation o f the evidence the
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authorities have and an opportunity to present his side o f the story.” The plaintiffs argued
that the case was not about disciplinary suspension but rather disciplinary transfer. A
consent decree was rendered and stated in part:
“When a student faces removal from his regularly assigned classroom, and the 
consequential recommendation for transfer, the consent decree requires the 
principal to give written notice to both the student and his parent in person or by 
certified mail detailing the reasons for the proposed transfer. Furthermore, the 
provisions o f the consent decree provide for an informal meeting between the 
student, his agents, and the principal before the transfer, as well as two formal 
hearings at which evidence may be presented and witnesses examined. (Jordan v. 
School Dist.. 1980 P. 87)”
The Court found that the decree clearly exceeded the rudimentary precautions 
required by Goss. Although there was no provision in the consent decree for notice or a 
hearing before a disruptive or dangerous student is physically removed from class, Goss 
indicated none is required as long as such removal is followed by appropriate notice and 
hearings, as was the case in Jordan v. School Dist.
According to the decree; a student who is non-disruptive or does not pose a 
continuing danger to persons or property could be removed from the classroom without 
notice or opportunity to explain his version of the occurrence at an informal meeting. 
Therefore, the Court added that a person who is non-disruptive or does not pose a 
continuing danger could not be removed until after notice of proposed action and basis 
therefore and opportunity to explain.
The Third Circuit District Court o f Appeals modified the original order and 
directed the addition of paragraph 32 and the deletion of paragraphs 33 and 34. The court 
also held that the relevance of Goss did not apply since the argument at hand was 
involuntary transfer as opposed to suspension.
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Case
White V . Salisbury Township School Dist., 588 F. Supp. 608, (E.D. Pa. 1984)
Procedural Setting
3^ Circuit - U.S. District Court
Facts
On February 1, 1980, an officer of the Salisbury Township Police Department 
conducted a surprise raid at the high school for the purpose o f confiscating drugs and 
paraphernalia. The target of the police was a group of students who regularly gathered 
outside the gymnasium doors each morning. Twenty-one students, including the 
plaintiffs, were arrested, taken inside the gymnasium, and searched. Although the police 
found marijuana and various articles of drug paraphernalia on a number of the students, 
no contraband was found on the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were directed to sign an 
attendance sheet and then report to their regularly scheduled classes. No disciplinary 
action was taken on that date.
Mr. White and Mr. Rappaport were told of the arrests and searches, which had 
taken place at the high school, and demanded information with respect to the arrest of 
their sons. Mr. White went to the police office and saw video surveillance, which 
purported to show David and Peter in the group of students smoking marijuana. He was 
also informed that several officers had observed his sons smoking.
On February 4, 1980, Mario Donnangelo, Principal, was given a report from the 
police department and immediately began to hold informal conferences with the students 
named in the report. The students were informed that they could attend the remainder of 
their classes, but could not come to class the next day and were to attend suspension
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hearings as a result of information provided school officials in the police report. Oral 
notification o f the hearing was ultimately given to all involved students. David White 
was absent from school on February 4, 1980, and although was not personally notified of 
the hearing to be held on February 5, 1980, both his brother and mother were notified and 
they passed the information to him and his father. Mr. White and Mr. Rappaport retained 
counsel for their sons. On February 5, 1980, the District was made aware that the 
White’s and the Rappaport’s had retained counsel. Therefore, the hearing was postponed 
until February 6, 1980 with the school and both families.
During the hearings, testimony was presented by the police officer involved and 
photographs were shown. The plaintiffs in their own behalf presented no testimony. At 
the conclusion of the hearing, a ten-day suspension was formally imposed. The school 
also explained that the suspension would not be made part o f any of the student’s 
permanent record. David White, Peter White and Eric Rappaport, brought suit against 
the Salisbury Township School District and the Salisbury Township Board of Education 
in the Third Circuit District Court for imposing suspensions on them without affording 
them due process o f law. The relevant facts were not seriously disputed.
Holding
The Court felt that the one-day delay of the hearing was in many ways attributable 
to the plaintiffs themselves and subsequently ruled in favor of the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment.
Rationale o f Holding
The Court ruled that the plaintiffs were orally notified of the charges against them 
and of the suspension hearing being held in connection with those charges, thereby.
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complying with the notice requirements o f Goss. There was a dispute as to whether the 
suspensions were imposed prior to or subsequent to the hearings. The Court ruled that 
although the plaintiffs were not afforded their right to a hearing prior to suspension, Goss 
points out that a hearing prior to suspension is merely a general rule to be followed 
particularly where the student’s removal from school occurs “almost immediately 
following the misconduct.” However, the school allowed the students to attend school 
for the remainder o f the day on February 1, 1980. Therefore, the Court reaffirmed Goss 
by ruling in favor o f the defendants.
Case
Palmer v. Merluzzi. 868 F.2d 90, (N.J. 1989)
Procedural Setting
3"̂  Circuit -  Court of Appeals / N.J.
Facts
Daniel Palmer was a senior at Hunterdon Central High School in September of 1986. 
He was also the starting wide receiver on the school’s football team and enrolled in a 
course titled “Careers Broadcasting Technology.” On September 28, 1986, Palmer and 
three other students were assigned to the school radio station which was located on the 
school’s property. The next morning, beer stains and a marijuana pipe were found at the 
radio station. Later that same day. Dr. Grimm, school disciplinarian, and Palmer’s 
football coach, met with Palmer at which time Daniel Palmer admitted to smoking 
marijuana the night before while at the radio station.
On September 30, 1986, Dr. Grimm sent a letter advising Palmer and his family 
that Daniel had been placed on a ten-day suspension. The Palmer’s took no action to
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contest the suspension. The Superintendent, Merluzzi, imposed a sixty-day suspension 
from interscholastic activities to all students involved in the incident approximately ten 
calendar days later. Mr. Palmer, Daniel’s father, heard that rumors that the additional 
penalties were to be imposed and subsequently attended a Board of Education meeting on 
October 13, 1986.
The Palmer’s then brought suit stating that it was the ninth day of the school 
suspension before any mention of additional penalties were announced. Thus Palmer 
alleged that the defendants violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment when they suspended Palmer from participating in extracurricular activities 
for sixty-days without notice and a hearing. The defendants moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that New Jersey and the majority of jurisdictions do not 
recognize a student’s property interest in extracurricular activities, and there being no 
property interest. Palmer was not entitled to due process protection before the suspension 
was imposed.
Holding
The Court ordered that the plaintiffs complaint be dismissed because 
extracurricular activities do not fall under the scope of property interests.
Rationale of Holding
The Court cited that “Legitimate claim of entitlement to a specific government 
benefit and not an abstract need or desire or a unilateral expectation” clearly gave Palmer 
a claimed property interest and entitlement to a public education (Board of Regents v. 
Roth 408 U.S. 564 1972 P. 577). In Burnside v. N.J.S.A. the students claimed that they 
had a constitutional right to participate on their high school’s interscholastic athletic
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teams. The Appellate Division disagreed. It found that “While extracurricular activities,
including interscholastic athletics, are important factors toward a sound and
comprehensive academic education, it emphasized that each pupil does not have a right to
participate in interscholastic athletics.”
The District Court stated, “Federal courts are not super referees over high school
athletic programs.” Therefore, the District Court ordered that the plaintiffs complaint be
dismissed. However, it should be noted that although the complaint was dismissed, the
Administrative Law Judge stated,
“This eleven hour, additional penalty, coming without official notice and without 
any chance to be heard, flies in the face o f all notions o f fundamental fairness. 
Because I believe Superintendent Merluzzi acted in a wholly arbitrary manner in 
taking away a protected property interest and what may have been Palmer’s only 
avenue to higher education, I respectfully dissent.” (Palmer v. Merluzzi. 1989 Pp. 
92 -93 )
Although the plaintiffs’ cited Goss, the case at hand merely reaffirmed Goss by 
establishing the fact that the intent of Goss was to protect the entire educational process. 
Judge Fisher, relying on New Jersey law, found that high school students do not have a 
property interest in playing football and, therefore, may be dismissed from a team 
without due process. Specifically, Judge Fisher held:
“As Roth indicates, any analysis concerning whether interscholastic 
athletics are protected should in the first instance be made by reference to 
state law. 408 U.S. at 577. In Dennis v. Holmdel Bd. o f  Ed., 1977 School 
Law Decision 388, New Jersey's Commissioner of Education stated,
"Participation in interscholastic athletics is a privilege which is subject to 
rules made by local boards of education". The Third Circuit has also held 
that a "right" to play basketball did not rise to the level o f a specific 
constitutional guarantee.” (Palmer v. Merluzzi. 1989 P. 98)
Therefore, extracurricular activities are not a property protected interest. Since 
extracurricular activities do not fall under a protected property interest deprivation of 
these “extra interests” are not protected by Goss.
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Case
Giangrasso v. Kittatinny Regional High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 865 F. Supp. 1133, (D.N.J. 
1994)
Procedural Setting 
3'̂ ‘* Circuit -  U.S. District Court / N.J.
Facts
On October 30, 1989, Giangrasso, a student at Kittatinny High School, was 
sleeping in class and when awoken by Ms. Kesselman, his teacher, he threatened to 
punch her in the head. Giangrasso’s claims were identical in nature to Kesselman’s with 
the exception that he claimed that Kesselman jerked his head back to awaken him. 
Witnesses in the classroom collaborated Kesselman’s version.
Ms. Kapler, Assistant Principal, confronted Giangrasso with the evidence and 
informed him that he would be suspended for five-days. Immediately after conducting 
the hearing, Giangrasso’s parents were informed. Giangrasso’s stepfather arrived at 
school to take him home and was also explained the charges against his stepson, the 
evidence, and the reasons for his suspension.
On November 1, 1989, the plaintiff was placed on homebound instruction, 
pending the result of a psychiatric review. On December 20, 1989, the plaintiffs Child 
Study Team mailed Giangrasso’s Individualized Education Plan that terminated the 
homebound instruction and directed that Giangrasso be returned to mainstream 
schooling. Four other potential special education placements were also presented. 
Giangrasso was subsequently accepted at High Point Regional High School in a special 
education program with a work-study component. Subsequently, Giangrasso brought suit
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against Kittatinny Regional High School Board of Education in the Third Circuit District 
Court.
Holding
The Court ruled in favor of the defendants by dismissing all claims because the 
jurisprudence outline in Goss v. Lopez was strictly adhered to.
Rationale of Holding 
The Court found that the due process afforded to Giangrasso was in line with 
Goss and ordered that the plaintiffs attorney Edward J. Gaffney, Jr., Esq. Pay to the 
defendants $100,000 and ordered that all claims be dismissed. Therefore, since 
Giangrasso was informed of the charges against him, given the opportunity to tell his side 
of the story, and presented with his due process rights, the Court reaffirmed Goss.
Case
Bartram v. Pennsburv Sch. Dist.. 1999 U.S. Dist. (E.D. Pa. May 24, 1999)
Procedural Setting
S"' Circuit -  U.S. District Court
Facts
Bartram was a tenth grade student at Pennsbury High School in Bucks County, 
Pennsylvania. On April 24, 1998, Bartram drove himself and three other students to 
school later than the starting time of school. Bartram and one of his passengers did not 
go to the attendance office as required when tardy to school because they were afraid of 
missing the field trip to the Great Adventure Theme Park.
A teacher, Sanchez, who asked them to breathe on him, confronted Bartram and 
the other student. He stated that they smelled like “pot” / marijuana. Mr. Knight
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confirmed Mr. Sanchez’s suspicion and informed Bartram and his friend that they were 
on suspension and then took them to his office. The plaintiff claimed that they were, 
“standing out in a field next to some kids that were smoking pot.” Based upon the strong 
odor of marijuana, Mr. Knight searched the plaintiff and his friend. The plaintiff was 
informed that he would be suspended for three-days and that depending on the outcome 
of an informal hearing; he could be suspended for seven more days. Katz also informed 
Bartram that he would not pursue further disciplinary action if  he revealed the names of 
the people who were smoking pot.
Bartram’s mother called Mr. Knight in order to find an explanation for her son’s 
suspension. Mr. Knight explained that her son was being suspended because he had, 
“either been smoking pot or had been around someone who was smoking pot for an 
extended period of time.” Mr. Knight then tried to schedule an informal hearing and Mrs. 
Bartram refused to cooperate and instead, demanded a letter advising her o f the 
suspension. Mrs. Bartram took her son for a drug test and the results indicated that he 
was drug free. That same day, she received a letter from Mr. Knight explaining her son’s 
three-day suspension, which also scheduled an informal hearing for April 29^.
During the hearing, Bartram admitted to being around students who were smoking 
but denied that he was smoking. Mr. Katz ultimately decided to allow Bartram to return 
to school the following day. The Bartram’s alleged that “despite knowing o f the drug test 
and the fact that it was entirely and completely negative, the school district has refused to 
amend the improper suspension.” Subsequently, Mary Bartram, on behalf of her son, 
Neal Bartram, brought suit against Pennsbury School District, William Katz / principal, 
Charles Knight / assistant principal, and Ray Sanchez / teacher in the Third Circuit
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District Court after Neal was suspended from school for three-days for smelling like 
marijuana.
Holding
The defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted and the cased was 
closed after the District Court found that Bartram was afforded procedural due process as 
dictated by Goss v. Lopez.
Rationale o f Holding
The District Court found that the plaintiff was suspended from school for a total
of three days. Thus, the due process requirements under Goss are applicable in this case.
Applying these standards, it was clear to the Court that the plaintiff was afforded all of
the process to which he was entitled under the circumstances pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Since the negative drug test was not available to the defendants at the time
of the suspension, the Court held that it could not have been a factor in the school’s
decision to send him home. The District Court found;
“The undisputed facts reveal that at the April 24th meeting. Plaintiff was notified 
that he was being suspended for violating the school policy against using drugs 
and was provided the opportunity to explain his side o f the facts. Plaintiff was 
informed by both Mr. Knight and Mr. Katz that the accusation was derived from 
his late arrival to school, the odor o f marijuana emanating from him, and his 
admission that he stood around people who were smoking marijuana. Mr. Katz 
also showed Plaintiff a copy o f the Student Conduct Policy and the relevant 
provision in question. Pursuant to the school's distribution of the policy, it can be 
inferred that Plaintiff possessed a copy of the policy. Indeed, Plaintiff never 
denies being aware of the policy provision in question. Finally, Mr. Katz asked 
for, and received. Plaintiffs version of the incident. Plaintiffs mother was then 
apprised of the situation through telephone conversations and letters. An informal 
hearing was conducted immediately after Plaintiffs three-day suspension where, 
again. Plaintiff was provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard.”
’’Moreover, this suspension procedure was neither negated nor undermined by 
Plaintiffs subsequent drug test indicating a negative result. As the test was not 
available to Defendants at the time Plaintiff was suspended, it could not have been
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a factor in the school officials' decision to send Plaintiff home, and consequently, 
cannot give rise to a procedural due process infirmity. Furthermore, procedural 
due process challenges based on the Pennsylvania Constitution are evaluated 
under the same standards as under the federal constitution.”
’’Accordingly, as Plaintiff was afforded adequate notice and an opportunity to be 
heard, he has failed to meet his burden of showing that Defendants' conduct 
violated a clearly established constitutional right.” (Bartram v. Pennsburv Sch. 
Dist.. 1999 P. 8)
Case
Brian A. v. Stroudsburg Area Sch. Dist.. 141 F. Supp. 2d 502, (M.D. Pa. 2001)
Procedural Setting
S"* Circuit -  U.S. District Court
Facts
Brian was a fifteen-year old tenth grade student who relocated sometime in March 
of 1999 from New Jersey to the Stroudsburg area with his family. On or about April 27, 
1999, Brian wrote a note that stated, “There’s a Bomb in tbis School bang bang! !” and 
left it on a table in his art class. Brian A. contended that the note was written as a joke 
for two girls in his class and that he forgot to throw it away after class. Brian A .’s 
teacher found the note and brought it to the attention o f the administration and school 
police. Brian was questioned about the note. Subsequently, Brian admitted to writing the 
note and to blowing up a shed while being on probation in New Jersey. Brian later stated 
that they, “just kept badgering me about it, and then 1 just ended up admitting it.” Brian’s 
father was called and requested to come to the school.
Brian and his father were informed that Brian would be suspended for ten-days 
for making terroristic threats. A letter was sent to Brian’s parents informing them that 
Brian was suspended from school for ten-days “for the following reason: bomb threat to
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school.” A few days later, Brian A .’s father again met with the school administration and 
was informed that Brian would not be reeeiving credit for the tenth grade. The plaintiff s 
father then met with the superintendent and was allegedly told that no charge would be 
brought against Brian A. if  he were to withdraw him from school. A letter dated June 2, 
1999, advised Brian’s parents that he was recommended for expulsion and that the 
proceeding would be initiated if  he were not voluntarily withdrawn from school. The 
letter acknowledged that Brian had signed a sworn statement indicating that he had never 
previously been suspended. The letter also outlined the previous incident that took place 
in New Jersey.
A letter advised the plaintiff and his family that an expulsion hearing would be 
held on June 14, 1999. The hearing was held without the plaintiff. Brian A .’s father 
stated that he did not attend the hearing because his counsel could not be present. 
Subsequently, Brian was permanently expelled from the Stroudsburg Area High School. 
Finally, Brian finished tenth grade through home schooling and was then enrolled in the 
eleventh grade at Bethesda, an alternative school at the District’s cost. Subsequently, 
Brian A. brought civil rights action on August 4, 1999, in the Third Circuit U.S. District 
Court against the Stroudsburg Area School District and Robert L. McGraw, 
superintendent. The plaintiff alleged that various constitutional rights violations arose 
from his suspension and later expulsion from the Stroudsburg High School.
Holding
The Court dismissed the plaintiffs claims without prejudice after it was 
determined by the District Court that Brian was provided the proeess that was due under 
Goss.
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Rationale of Holding
The Court held that the school officials, with regard to the suspension, provided 
the process that was due under Goss. Furthermore, the plaintiffs were given ample 
opportunity to attend the expulsion hearing on June 14, 1999, and failed to attend. 
Therefore despite the fact that the hearing was not convenient for the plaintiffs, they were 
afforded full due process.
Summary
Nine cases relevant to this study from the 3'̂ '̂  Circuit were briefed. Specifically, 
seven from the U.S. District Court and two from the U.S. 3"̂  Circuit Court o f Appeals 
were examined for relevance. Furthermore, of the nine cases all but one were sided in 
favor of the Defendants (Everett v. Marcase. 1997).
Case Law (4**̂  Circuit)
Case
Baker v. Owen. 395 F. Supp. 294, (M.D.N.C. 1975)
Procedural Setting 
4**̂ Circuit -  U.S. District Court / M.D.
Facts
The facts of the case arose when Russell Carl Baker was paddled on December 6, 
1973, for allegedly violating his teacher’s announced rule against throwing kickballs 
except during designated play periods. Mrs. Baker had previously requested that her son 
not be corporally punished. However, shortly after the alleged misconduct her son 
received two licks in the presence of a second teacher and in view of other students.
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Mrs. Baker stated that the administration o f the corporal punishment violated her 
parental right to determine disciplinary methods for her child. Russell notified Owen that 
the circumstances in which the punishment was administered violated his right to 
procedural due process and that the punishment itself amounted to cruel and unusual 
punishment. The Baker’s further claimed that the statue, which empowers school 
officials to, “use reasonable force in the exercise of lawful authority to restrain or correct 
pupil and to maintain order,” was unconstitutional because it allowed corporal 
punishment over parental objection and absence of adequate of procedural safeguards. 
Subsequently, Russell Carl Baker and his mother filed suit against W.C. Owen, Principal 
of Gibsonville School, stating that Russell’s constitutional rights were violated when his 
teacher corporally punished him over his mother’s objections and without procedural due 
process.
Holding
The District Court ruled in favor of the defendants after deciding that the 
plaintiffs due process rights were not violated.
Rationale o f Holding 
The Court held that the North Carolina general Statutes (1 1 5 -  146) were not 
unconstitutional. They also held that to implement the statue without giving students 
procedural due process would be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, 
the District Court suggested minimal procedures would satisfy fhe Fourteenth 
Amendment, and that nothing is intended to prevent or dissuade the state from further 
elaboration upon necessary requirements in order to accomplish fairness in administration 
of schools. Finally, the District Court ruled that based on the facts o f the case, the
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punishment of Russell Carl Baker was not cruel and unusual within the meaning of the 
eighth amendment.
The District Court held that Fourteenth Amendment liberty embraces the right of
parents to control the means of discipline of their children, but that the state has a
countervailing interest in the maintenance of order in the schools. In this particular case
the law was sufficient to sustain the right of teachers and school officials to administer
reasonable corporal punishment for disciplinary purposes and that teachers and school
officials must accord to students a minimal procedural due process in the course of
inflicting such punishment. This was based upon the North Carolina General Statue
(115-146), which read as follows:
“Duties o f teachers generally; principals and teachers may use reasonable force 
in exercising lawful authority. — It shall be the duty of all teachers, including 
student teachers, substitute teachers, voluntary teachers, teachers' aides and 
assistants when given authority over some part o f the school program by the 
principal or supervising teacher, to maintain good order and discipline in their 
respective schools; to encourage temperance, morality, industry, and neatness; to 
promote the health of all pupils, especially o f children in the first three grades, by 
providing frequent periods o f recreation, to supervise the play activities during 
recess, and to encourage wholesome exercises for all children; to teach as 
thoroughly as they are able all branches which they are required to teach; to 
provide for singing in the school, and so far as possible to give instruction in the 
public school music; and to enter actively into the plans of the superintendent for 
the professional growth of the teaehers. (North Carolina Statues, 1975 P. 115)”
Principals, teachers, substitute teachers, voluntary teachers, teachers' aids and 
assistants and student teachers in the public schools of this State may use 
reasonable force in the exercise of lawful authority to restrain or correct pupils 
and maintain order. No county or city board o f education or district committee 
shall promulgate or continue in effect a rule, regulation or bylaw that prohibits the 
use of such force as is specified in this section. (North Carolina Statues, 1975 P. 
146)”
Defendants argued that school officials can corporally punish pupils over parental 
objections without antecedent procedural safeguards. The Defendants also cited statue as
108
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
authority for their position, thus there was no dispute that they had authority under the 
statue to engage in such practice. The basis of the challenge was that the cited statute 
allowed the power to administer corporal punishment and suspend pupils without 
procedural safeguards. The District Court saw no difference between Baker v. Owens 
and Goss and therefore rejected the Defendants’ claim.
The District Court agreed with Mrs. Baker that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
concept of liberty embraced the right of a parent to determine and choose between means 
of discipline of children, but few constitutional rights are absolute. The Court also 
rejected Mrs. Baker’s suggestion that her right was fundamental, and that the state can 
punish her child corporally only if it showed a compelling interest that outweighed her 
parental right.
Different consideration came into play with Baker’s claim that the statue allowed 
corporal punishment without due process. The District Court believed that Russell Carl 
Baker had an interest, protected by the concept of liberty in the fourteenth amendment, in 
avoiding corporal punishment. The announced possibility o f corporal punishment and an 
attempt to modify behavior by some other means would insure that the child had clear 
notice that certain behavior would subject him to physical punishment. The student need 
not be afforded a formal opportunity to present his side to a second school official (who 
must be present and be informed of the reason for the punishment.) The official who had 
administered the punishment must only provide the child’s parent, upon request, a written 
explanation of the reasons and the name of the second official who was present. 
Therefore, the Court ruled that under the constitution the school had legally sufficient
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authority to administer the corporal punishment without satisfying the stipulations of 
Goss.
Case
Hillman V. Elliott. 436 F. Supp. 812, (W.D. Va. 1977)
Procedural Setting
4'^ Circuit -  U.S. District Court
Facts
On November 2, 1976, David Hillman was a student at Gate High School in Gate 
City, Virginia, when he was charged with being disrespectful to a teacher and when he 
used abusive language to his fellow students. That same day, the plaintiffs parents 
received notice of the plaintiffs three-day suspension by the school’s principal. Hillman 
admitted that he had used abusive language to at least one student. The school board 
notified the parents o f a hearing on the recommended suspension to be held on November 
30, 1976. Hillman and his parents failed to attend the hearing and subsequently the board 
upheld the reeommendation for suspension.
Due to the fact that the Defendants’ were uncertain about whether they had 
followed their disciplinary code regulations for suspending a student, they started the 
disciplinary process over by notifying the plaintiffs parents by letter, which was dated 
January 4, 1977. The letter also advised o f a hearing to be held in the principal’s office. 
After the hearing, the principal suspended Hillman for three days subject to appeal. The 
Hillman’s made their due proeess objections and then withdrew David from school, at 
which time the suspension was upheld. The plaintiff and his parents appealed to the Scott 
County School Board and only made due process objections before walking out. After
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being notified that the Board had upheld the suspension, the plaintiff s filed suit in the 
court.
Holding
The Court found that the plaintiff was afforded due process as required by Goss. 
by substantially complying with their disciplinary rules o f suspension, which went well 
beyond the constitutional minimum, and satisfied the due process clause. Therefore, the 
Court denied the relief requested by the plaintiffs.
Rationale of Holding
The first issue confronted by the Court was whether the rule enunciated by Goss 
V. Lopez is applicable to a three-day suspension from school. The Court in Goss held 
that a ten-day suspension from school is not de minimis. . .and may not be imposed in 
complete disregard of the Due Process Clause. The issue turned on whether or not a 
three-day suspension is de minimis. Although the Court recognized that expulsion from 
the educational process for more than a trivial period is a serious event in the life of a 
suspended child, it also found that a three-day suspension is not de minimis and therefore, 
due process was required in the suspension of Hillman.
Having decided that due process was entitled, the Court determined that the 
plaintiff and his parents received written notice of the charges, were advised of the 
hearing, and had the right to a representative. The Plaintiff s, however, alleged that the 
due process afforded after January 1977, did not cure the taint, a neutral hearing officer 
was not assigned, and that the Defendants failed to follow their own rules for suspending 
a student.
I l l
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The Court ruled that the Plaintiff did have notice and a hearing in the early stages 
of the proceedings at which time the Plaintiff admitted to having used abusive language 
to one student. Courts have indicated that due process in the school setting does not have 
to adhere to prescribed patterns. Since Hillman admitted to violating a rule, no time 
elapsed between giving notice and holding and therefore, did not raise procedural 
problems. No real evidence was presented to indicate that the principal was biased. 
Hillman contended that while he was advised of the rules he was charged with having 
violated, he was never advised of the “facts and circumstances surrounding the 
violation.” According to Goss, a student must only be advised o f the charges against 
him. Finally, on three occasions, the plaintiffs had the opportunity to find the specifics of 
the charges but instead chose to walk out of the proceedings.
Case
Pegram v. Nelson. 469 F. Supp. 1134, (M.D.N.C. 1979)
Procedural Setting 
4*'' Circuit -  U.S. District Court / N.C.
Facts
On January 26, 1976, Alvin Long, Wayne Botts, and Pegram attended a 
basketball game at Northeast Junior High, in Greensboro, North Carolina. Pegram was 
fourteen years old and in the ninth grade. Mrs. Jean Trantham discovered that her 
billfold, which contained about $65, had been stolen and informed the Defendant, Nelson 
/ Principal about the theft. She also stated that the Plaintiff and the other two boys had 
been sitting behind her. She further explained that all three boys had left the gymnasium 
just before she noticed that her billfold was missing. Pegram and his two friends were
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detained at which point Botts and Long handed over $42. Pegram was searched,
however, no money was found.
Long and Botts wrote written statements that detailed how Pegram had stolen the
money. The billfold was recovered and Nelson continued his interview of Pegram.
Pegram’s father was notified by phone and arrived at the school shortly thereafter.
Pegram continued to deny his part in the theft and was informed the following day at
school that he would be suspended, beginning January 29, for ten school days, and that he
would not be allowed on school grounds after 3:15 p.m. for the remainder of the school
year. The plaintiffs parents received a letter from Nelson, dated January 28, 1976,
informing them that:
“ .. .your son is suspended from Northeast Junior High School for ten school days, 
starting on January 29, 1976. He may return to school on Thursday, February 12, 
1976. Also, Lawrence is not to be on the Northeast Junior High School grounds 
except during regular school hours. He may not attend any after school activities. 
This is to be for the remainder o f the 1 9 7 5 -7 6  school year. (Pegram v. Nelson. 
1979 P. 1137)”
Pegram’s father met with Nelson after reading the letter in order to discuss the 
incident. At that meting, Mr. Pegram offered the names of four students who might have 
had evidence bearing on the incident. After interviewing the students. Nelson contacted 
Pegram’s father and notified him that the information obtained did not alter his findings.
Holding
The Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment was denied after sufficient 
evidence that Pegram had been afforded his proeedural due process and therefore, the 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted.
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Rationale o f Holding 
The Supreme Court cited Goss as the leading case on the applicability o f due 
process to student diseipline. The Court held that the student had a “legitimate 
entitlement to a public education.” The Court also found that an informal hearing is 
sufficient when a student is given a short suspension that does not exceed ten-days.
On the day of the incident, the principal told the Plaintiff o f the accusations and 
gave him an opportunity to respond. Therefore, Pegram was given due process rights that 
were fully in accord with Goss. The Plaintiff, however, was issued a second penalty. He 
was not allowed on school grounds after regular school hours for a period of four months.
The Court held that participation in interscholastic sports or extracurricular 
activities is not, by and in itself a property interest. The Court cited Colorado Seminary 
V. N.C.A.A.. Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association. Dallam v. 
Cumberland Valiev School District. Tavlor v. Alabama High School Athletic 
Association. Denis J. O ’Connell High School v. Virginia High School League, and 
Bishop V. Wood, with regard to its decision. Since there was not a property interest, 
denial to participate in one or several extracurricular activities did not give rise to a right 
to due process. Therefore, the Plaintiff was not precluded from participating in all 
extracurricular activities, but only those occurring after school for a period o f four 
months. (Pegram v. Nelson. 1979 Pp. 1139 - 1141)
Case
Doe V. Rockingham Countv School Bd.. 658 L. Supp. 403, (W.D. Va. 1987)
Procedural Setting
4'"̂  Circuit -  U.S. District Court
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Facts
John Doe was an eight-year old third grader at Bridgewater Elementary School. 
“John, Jr. had long been a diseiplinary problem and had been involved in a series of 
incidents which were both disruptive and somewhat violent.” (Doe, 1987) Affidavits 
indicate that he had long been a disciplinary problem, which had caused school officials 
to consider a transfer to another school until the precipitating occurrence. While Doe’s 
actions were not life threatening, and his stature was small enough to permit him to be 
physically restrained, he periodically engaged himself in verbal and physical temper 
tantrums, which included kicking, scratching, and hitting teachers and students. After a 
severe incident on January 9, 1986, Doe was suspended for 35 days from school, from 
January 10 to February 13, 1986 (the next board hearing).
The plaintiffs mother contacted the superintendent and Doe was reinstated on 
January 13, 1986. Two days later another disruptive incident occurred and Doe was 
again suspended. The school board refused to grant a hearing until the next school board 
hearing. On January 20, 1986, a licensed psychologist determined that Doe suffered from 
a learning disability. The school stated that diagnosis of Doe would begin on February 3, 
1986. After being informed o f the diagnosis, Mr. Pellman refused to reinstate John, Jr. 
and the parents were urged to consider homebound instruction. Subsequently, this action 
was brought on behalf o f a learning disabled child, “John Doe” by his parent, seeking the 
child’s readmission to school during the pendency of a twenty-nine-day suspension from 
school for disciplinary problems.
Holding
The Court ruled that by applying the standard of Goss, the plaintiffs right to a 
due process hearing had been violated.
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Rationale of Holding 
On February 4, 1986, the plaintiff filed the instant cause o f action seeking a 
temporary restraining order to force John, Jr.’s readmission to school and to order further 
procedural due process. In a hearing conducted on February 6, 1986, the Court granted 
the plaintiffs motion. On February 18, 1986, John Jr. was reinstated at Pleasant Valley 
Elementary School.
Under Virginia’s statutory law schools were allowed to suspend students up to a
period of thirty days pending a decision by the school. Furthermore, the law of the
Commonwealth of Virginia did not contemplate a hearing within 72 hours, and could in
fact he read to mean that suspensions could continue during the pendency of committee
hearing and an appeal to the full school board for a period not to exceed 30 days after the
committed hearing. It was noted that the complaint indicated that the school officials
talked to John Sr. on January 15, 1986, however it was not contended by defendants that
the brief encounter constituted a hearing for due process purposes. Thus, applying the
standard o f Goss, the plaintiffs right to a due process hearing had been violated.
“The plaintiff has due process rights, since Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 42 L. Ed. 
2d 725, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975), indicates that a disciplinary suspension for even a 
normal child creates more than a de minimis liberty interest for a school child. 
Under Goss, the plaintiff would be entitled to notice and at least an informal 
hearing at which he could give his version o f the events. See Goss, supra, at 582- 
84. For even a 10-day suspension, the court stated that in certain cases the school 
official "may then determine himself to summon the accuser, permit cross- 
examination, and allow the student to present his own witnesses. In more difficult 
cases, he may permit counsel." Id. at 584. The Supreme Court also notes that 
longer suspensions "may require more formal procedures." Id. In this case, the 
parents of John, Jr. clearly had ample notice of the reasons for the suspension 
from school officials. When the plaintiffs father picked John, Jr. up from school 
on January 15, 1986, he spoke with Mr. Dishner. Mr. Doe was told that "John, Jr. 
was suspended from school until February 13 at which time the School Board 
would meet to consider the child's return to school." Complaint at p. 4. It then 
becomes necessary to decide whether this brief meeting constituted a due process
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hearing, whether the plaintiff was under a duty to request further due process, and 
whether the school was under an obligation to furnish the plaintiff with 
information regarding what further due process remedies were available, in order 
to decide whether the plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies.
”It is clear that when a student's conduct disrupts the academic atmosphere o f the 
school and endangers fellow students, teachers, or school officials, or damages 
property, the Supreme Court opinion in Goss, at 572, requires that notice of 
suspension proceedings be sent to the student's parents and that a hearing be held, 
with the student present, "as soon as practicable." Id. at 583. In Goss, the Supreme 
Court affirmed a district court opinion which specified that notice should be 
usually given within 24 hours and that a hearing should be held within 72 hours. 
Clearly Goss did not contemplate that a due process hearing 29 days later would 
be adequate. (Doe v. Rockingham Countv School Bd. 1987 P. 407)”
Under due process considerations, failure on the part of school authorities to
afford a hearing is not excused by later proof that the student is guilty of the offense as
charged. Thus, the necessity of a prompt hearing is a constitutional prerequisite, as set
forth in Goss, despite the fact the Virginia’s statutory law allowed suspensions to remain
in effect for a period o f up to 30-days pending decision by a school board.
Case
Broussard v. School Bd. of Norfolk. 801 F. Supp. 1526, (E.D. Va. 1992)
Procedural Setting
4'*’ Circuit -  U.S. District Court
Facts
The facts o f this case stemmed from Kimberly Ann Broussard’s refusal to change 
out of a shirt printed with the words “Drugs Suck” and was subsequently placed on a one- 
day suspension. Furthermore, Broussard claimed that she was deprived of her right to 
due process by being suspended summarily, without according her notice or an 
opportunity to be heard.
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The school’s administration found the shirt inappropriate for school due to the
word “Suck” and asked the plaintiff if  she had another shirt, if  she could borrow a shirt,
or if she would turn the shirt inside out for the day in which she refused all three options.
Broussard’s mother was contacted and she informed the administration that she would
have her husband bring a shirt as soon as possible. Five hours later, the plaintiffs
stepfather arrived with another shirt. Mr. Caprio, school administrator, explained in front
of the plaintiffs that Broussard could either change her shirt or go home for the
remainder of the day. Mr. Lord, stepfather, had the impression that she was suspended if
she did not change the shirt, even if she went home for the remainder of the day.
Later the same day, Mr. Lord contacted the school and inquired if his daughter
had been suspended at which time he was informed that she had not been. He replied that
Broussard would return to school wearing the “Drugs Suck” shirt. The Principal stated,
“in that case she is suspended.” Mrs. Lord said that she would return to school to obtain
a suspension notice, which according to both parties occurred. Broussard’s parents
followed the chain o f command with respect to appeal for suspension and contacted Dr.
Carter who stated that he would not reverse the principal’s decision and wrote:
“Clothing containing messages couched in strong language is inappropriate, 
especially when the language has an overt sexual connotation. Such messages are 
even more likely to be disruptive when directed at adolescents as opposed to 
mature adults. (Broussard v. School Bd. of Norfolk. 1992 P. 1503)”
Subsequently, this action was brought by Kimberly Ann Broussard against the
School Board of the City of Norfolk based on assertions that school administrators
violated her Fourteenth and First Amendment rights.
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Holding
The Court found in favor o f the Defendants due process claim since the Plaintiff 
was given notice and opportunity to be heard.
Rationale of Holding 
The Plaintiffs did not appeal to the school board, the next level of appeal, but 
instead, with the support of the American Civil Liberties Union, filed a civil rights action. 
The Court ruled that Broussard and her parents had received notice that the shirt she wore 
to school violated school rules. Furthermore, the District Court cited Goss by stating 
that, “due process requires that a student facing suspension of ten days or less must 
receive oral or written notice o f the charge against her and an opportunity to present her 
story. No waiting period between the misconduct and the hearing is required.” Finally, 
the Court found that prior to her one-day suspension, Broussard received adequate notice 
of the conduct that the school found in violation of school rules, that Broussard and her 
father had adequate opportunity to rebut the school administrators’ finding that the shirt 
was inappropriate attire for school, and the plaintiff rejected the opportunity to avoid 
suspension either by changing the shirt or by voluntarily going home for the remainder of 
the day.
Case
Ratner v. Loudoun County Pub. Sch.. 16 Fed. Appx. 140, (4̂ '’ Cir. 2001)
Procedural Setting
4̂*̂ Circuit -  Court of Appeals
119
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Facts
In October 1999, Benjamin Ratner, was thirteen-years old and in the eighth grade 
at Blue Ridge Middle School in Loudoun County, Virginia. On October 8, 1999, a 
schoolmate told Ratner that she had been suicidal the previous evening, had contemplated 
killing herself by slitting her wrists, and that she had brought a knife to school in her 
binder. Ratner took her binder and put it in his locker. Although he did not tell school 
authorities, he allegedly intended to tell both his and her parents after school. By 
lunchtime that same day, Roberta Griffith, Assistant Principal, had learned of the knife.
Kellogg, Dean, believed that Ratner acted in the best interest of the girl and that 
Ratner did not pose a thereat to harm anyone with the knife. Nonetheless, Ratner was 
suspended by Griffith for ten-days for possessing a knife on school grounds in violation 
of school board policy. Four days later the Principal affirmed the suspension with written 
notice and two days after that Edgar Hatrick, Superintendent, informed Ratner that he 
was being suspended indefinitely pending further action by the school board, which 
ultimately became a suspension for the remainder of the school term which ended 
February 1, 2000. Ratner’s parents requested and received the hearing before the school 
district’s Discipline Committee to appeal, but that committee unanimously approved 
Ratner’s long-term suspension. Subsequently, Ratner v. Loudoun was heard in the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2001.
Holding
The Court dismissed Ratner’s complaint for failure to state a claim of due process 
violations.
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Rationale of Holding 
Ratner’s complaint asserted that his suspension under zero tolerance policy 
amounted to violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Board policy in such cases 
began with a presumption that offending students will be expelled but allowed school 
officials discretion, “to such lesser disciplinary action, including long-term suspension, as 
may be deemed appropriate.” The Court dismissed Ratner’s complaint for failure to sate 
a claim of due process violations. The District Court also concluded, correctly, that the 
school officials gave Ratner constitutionally sufficient, even if imperfect, process in the 
various notices and hearings it accorded him thereby, not only adhering but also 
reaffirming Goss.
Dissenting/Concurring Opinions 
However harsh the result in this case, the federal court was not called upon to 
judge the wisdom of a zero tolerance policy. Therefore the Court was limited to whether 
Ratner’s complaint alleged sufficient facts which if proved would show that the 
implementation of the school’s policy failed to comport with the United States 
Constitution. Judge Hamilton concurred and wrote the following which is presented in 
part:
“I write separately to express my compassion for Ratner, his family, and common 
sense. Each is the victim of good intentions run amuck... There is no doubt that 
this zero-tolerance/automatic suspension policy...were adopted in large response 
to the tragic school shootings that have plagued our nation’s schools over the past 
several years....Here a young man, Ratner, took a binder containing a knife from 
a suicidal fellow student in an effort to save her life.. .The facts do not offer even 
the hint of a suggestion that Ratner ever intended to personally possess the knife 
or harm anyone with it. ...Suffice it to say that the degree of Ratner’s violation of 
school policy does not correlate with the degree of his punishment...But alas, as 
the opinion for the court explains, this is not a federal constitutional problem. 
(Ratner v. Loudoun County Pub. Sch., 2001 P. 146)”
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